Reconsidering the Artful Pleading Doctrine by Ragazzo, Robert A.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 44 | Issue 2 Article 2
1-1993
Reconsidering the Artful Pleading Doctrine
Robert A. Ragazzo
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert A. Ragazzo, Reconsidering the Artful Pleading Doctrine, 44 Hastings L.J. 273 (1993).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol44/iss2/2
Reconsidering the Artful Pleading Doctrine
by
ROBERT A. RAGAZZO*
The artful pleading doctrine is utilized by federal courts to trans-
form claims pled under state law into federal claims in order to confer
removal jurisdiction.' Although a quarter-century old 2 and little ques-
tioned,3 the artful pleading doctrine contradicts both precedent and
sound jurisdictional theory. During the past decade, the Supreme Court
has decided a string of cases that have enlarged the scope of the artful
pleading doctrine. This Article considers the artful pleading doctrine in
its original form and its more recent manifestations. It concludes that
the artful pleading doctrine is an ill-advised departure from more than a
century of established law and should be recanted or limited to the nar-
rowest possible extent.
I. Introduction
A. Federal Question Jurisdiction
Under Article III of the United States Constitution and Title 28 of
the United States Code, the federal courts have the power to entertain
cases that arise under federal law.4 The constitutional grant of jurisdic-
tional power has been interpreted broadly and includes cases that contain
any federal component. 5 The statutory grant of jurisdictional power,
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ham College; J.D. 1985, Harvard Law School. The author wishes to thank Seth Chandler,
David Crump, David Dow, Dennis Duffy, Miguel Estrada, Yale Rosenberg, and Eugene
Smith for their thoughtful comments on a draft of this article. The author also wishes to thank
Amy Barton, Jennifer Breidenbach, David Denny, Paul Mansur, and Thomas Rannells for
their research assistance.
1. See, e.g., Travelers Indem. Co. v. Sarkisian, 794 F.2d 754, 758 (2d Cir.), cerL denied,
479 U.S. 885 (1986).
2. The Supreme Court first recognized the artful pleading doctrine in Avco Corp. v.
Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
3. See Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 397 n.2 (1981) (describing
the artful pleading doctrine as a "settled principle"); Sullivan v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc., 813
F.2d 1368, 1372 n.5 (9th Cir.) (describing the artful pleading doctrine as "well-established"),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987).
4. See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
5. See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824).
which has been interpreted more restrictively, is the focus of this Article.
As a general rule, "[a] suit arises under the law that creates the cause of
action."'6 Under this rule, the federal district courts have federal ques-
tion jurisdiction when Congress has created a remedy in a particular
area7 or the federal courts have implied a remedy from some body of
federal law.8
There are two exceptions to the general rule. First, a federally cre-
ated claim does not arise under federal law if it lacks a substantial federal
element. 9 Second, a state created claim does arise under federal law if it
contains a substantial federal element.10 Combining the two exceptions,
6. American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916)
(Holmes, J.).
7. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1988) (granting a private right of action under the anti-
trust laws); 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1988) (granting a private right of action to redress certain securi-
ties law violations); 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1988) (granting a private right of action to redress
racketeering injuries).
8. The courts have used a variety of sources to create implied federal remedies, includ-
ing the Constitution, see, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (recognizing an implied right of action under the Fourth
Amendment), statutes, see, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456
U.S. 353 (1982) (recognizing an implied right of action under the Commodity Exchange Act, 7
U.S.C. §§ 1-24 (Supp. 1 1978)), and administrative regulations, see, e.g., Herman & MacLean
v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983) (accepting the existence of a private right of action under
SEC rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982)).
9. See, e.g., Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 509 (1900) (holding that
claims to enforce federally created land titles did not arise under federal law because Congress
made such titles dependent on local standards); T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 825-
27 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.) (holding that a federally created copyright claim did not arise
under federal law when the only issues in the case related to the validity of state law defenses),
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 915 (1965). It has been suggested that a federally created claim does not
arise under federal law unless some federal element of the plaintiff's claim is disputed. See,
e.g., Gully v. First Nat'1 Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 113-14 (1936) (Cardozo, J.); Shulthis v. McDou-
gal, 225 U.S. 561, 569-70 (1912). This view is questionable because it makes the existence of
federal question jurisdiction turn on whether the defendant's answer disputes the federal ele-
ments of the plaintiffs claim. See PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FED-
ERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 999 (3d ed. 1988); 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT
ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3562, at 27 (2d ed. 1984).
10. See, e.g., Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199-202 (1921) (hold-
ing that a state claim to enjoin a corporation from investing in certain federal bonds arose
under federal law when the plaintiff alleged that the federal statute authorizing issuance of the
bonds was unconstitutional). Smith was called into question by Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986), in which the Supreme Court found that there was
no federal question jurisdiction over a state tort claim that alleged misbranding of a drug in
violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-394 (1982 & Supp.
III 1985). The Court held that the federal element of the plaintiffs claim was insubstantial
because there was no private right of action under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
Thompson, 478 U.S. at 814. Based on Thompson, lower courts have refused to exercise federal
jurisdiction when the plaintiff lacks an actionable federal claim. See Smith v. Industrial Valley
Title Ins. Co., 957 F.2d 90, 93 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3034 (1992); Willy v. Coastal
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the general rule might be rephrased: federal question jurisdiction exists
whenever the plaintiff's claim contains a substantial federal element.11
Because the plaintiff's claim must contain a substantial federal ele-
ment, the plaintiff cannot assert federal question jurisdiction by anticipat-
ing federal defenses to claims based entirely on state law. 12 It makes no
difference if the defendant concedes the plaintiff's state claims and the
only real controversy relates to the federal defenses.13 The rule that one
cannot gain access to federal court by pleading or anticipating federal
defenses is known as the well-pleaded complaint rule.14 This rule is over
one hundred years old.1 5
The standards for removal jurisdiction are generally the same as the
standards for original jurisdiction.1 6 As a consequence, a defendant can-
not create federal question jurisdiction by pleading federal defenses to
Corp., 855 F.2d 1160, 1168 (5th Cir. 1988); Miller v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 834 F.2d 556, 562
(6th Cir. 1987); Utley v. Varian Assocs., 811 F.2d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 484 U.S.
824 (1987). After Thompson, it is unclear what is left of the rule that federal jurisdiction
extends to some state created claims. See BATOR ET AL., supra note 9, at 1020. The special
rule for state created claims aids plaintiffs only when they do not have a federal claim. There is
an independent basis for jurisdiction when there is a private right of action to enforce the
federal element of a plaintiff's state claim. The state claim can then be asserted as a pendent
claim.
11. The difficulty with lumping the two exceptions together is that after Thompson, it is
unclear how much remains of the doctrine that a state claim with a substantial federal element
arises under federal law. After Thompson, it is also questionable whether the substantiality
requirement is the same for federal and state created claims. Thompson may be viewed as
establishing a higher standard of substantiality for the latter. See supra note 10.
12. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9-
12 (1983); Gully, 299 U.S. at 113; Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152-54 (1908).
13. E.g., Franchise Tax Bd, 463 U.S. at 12; Mottley, 211 U.S. at 151-52.
14. See, eg., Franchise Tax Bd, 463 U.S. at 9-10.
15. See Metcalf v. Watertown, 128 U.S. 586, 588-90 (1888). The decision in Metcalfhas
been described as inconsequential because under the removal statute then in force, even though
the plaintiff could not obtain original jurisdiction based on an anticipated federal defense,
either party could remove a state case after a federal defense was actually asserted. See
Michael G. Collins, The Unhappy History of Federal Question Removal, 71 IowA L. REV. 717,
731-33 (1986). The first case under the current removal statute to hold that a defendant could
not remove a case based on a federal defense was Tennessee v. Union & Planter's Bank, 152
U.S. 454 (1894).
16. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (granting removal jurisdiction over
"civil action[s] brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have
original jurisdiction"). In a few circumstances, removal jurisdiction is broader, see, eg., 28
U.S.C. §§ 1441(c), 1442-1443 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (allowing removal of separate and in-
dependent state claims joined with federal claims, certain actions against federal officers, and
certain civil rights cases), or narrower, see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1988) (denying removal of
claims brought pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77z (1988)); 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1441(b), 1445 (1988) (denying removal of cases involving complete diversity when any de-
fendant is a citizen of the forum state, and cases brought under certain labor laws), than origi-
nal jurisdiction.
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state claims alleged in state court. According to a rule that is at least
eighty years old, the plaintiff is the master of his complaint.17 Thus, a
plaintiff may prevent removal by pleading only state claims and ignoring
any federal claims he might have. 18 The defendant may not remove the
case to federal court by claiming that the plaintiff is forum-shopping by
asserting only state claims. The defendant is also barred from removing
a case in which a plaintiff asserts only state claims even if federal claims
have come to predominate in the particular area of the law.
B. The Artful Pleading Doctrine
The Supreme Court first promulgated the artful pleading doctrine as
a challenge to the well-pleaded complaint and master-of-the-complaint
rules in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735.19 In Avco, the Supreme Court
held that a claim pled under state law will be deemed to arise under
federal law when the state law on which the plaintiff purports to rely is
preempted by federal law, and the only possible relief is federal. 20 In
these circumstances, the plaintiff may not defeat the defendant's right to
removal by failing to plead federal law.21
The lower courts attempted to reconcile A vco with accepted law by
distinguishing between cases in which federal law preempts state claims
17. See, e.g., Healy v. Sea Gull Specialty Co., 237 U.S. 479, 480 (1915) (noting that "the
plaintiff is absolute master of what jurisdiction he will appeal to"); Fair v. Kohler Die & Spe-
cialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913) (noting that "the party who brings a suit is master to decide
what law he will rely upon"). For a criticism of the master-of-the-complaint rule, see A. Mark
Segreti, Jr., The Federal Preemption Question-A Federal Question? An Analysis of Federal
Jurisdiction Over Supremacy Clause Issues, 33 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 653, 675 (1984-1985) [here-
inafter Segreti The Federal Preemption Question].
18. See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 809 n.6
(1986) ("Jurisdiction may not be sustained on a theory that the plaintiff has not advanced.");
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Sarkisian, 794 F.2d 754, 758 (2d Cir. 1986) (" '[W]here plaintiff's
claim involves both a federal ground and a state ground, the plaintiff is free to ignore the
federal question and pitch his claim on the state ground' to defeat removal." (quoting IA
JAMES W. MOORE & BRETT A. RINGLE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.160, at 185 (2d
ed. 1979))), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 885 (1986).
19. 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
20. Id. at 560.
21. As explained in a leading treatise:
[O]ccasionally the removal court will seek to determine whether the real nature of
the claim is federal, regardless of plaintiff's characterization. For instance, in many
contexts plaintiff's claim may be one that is exclusively governed by federal law, so
that the plaintiff necessarily is stating a federal cause of action, whether he chooses to
articulate it that way or not. If the only remedy available to plaintiff is federal, be-
cause of preemption or otherwise, and the state court necessarily must look to federal
law in passing on the claim, the case is removable regardless of what is in the
pleading.
14A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 3722, at 266-75 (2d ed. 1985) (citations omitted).
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and replaces them with parallel federal claims and cases in which federal
preemption extinguishes any right to relief. The lower courts tended to
allow removal only in the former category. 22 Although Avco may seem
to be consistent with traditional jurisdictional principles, a careful analy-
sis demonstrates that this appearance is an illusion. 23
The Supreme Court paved the way for the potential expansion of
Avco in Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust.24
One portion of the Court's opinion confirmed the lower courts' rule al-
lowing removal only when federal law preempts a plaintiff's state law
claims and simultaneously replaces them with federal claims.25 The
opinion also suggests, however, that removal is justified whenever federal
law completely preempts state law, without regard to whether federal
law replaces the preempted state claims.26 This expansive view of
Franchise Tax Board is a broad departure from the well-pleaded com-
plaint and master-of-the-complaint rules.27
In 1981, the Supreme Court created a new branch of the artful
pleading doctrine. Prior to 1981, most artful pleading cases allowed re-
moval based on federal preemption of state law. In Federated Depart-
ment Stores, Inc. v. Moitie,28 the Supreme Court extended this doctrine
by allowing removal of state claims that were not preempted by federal
law.29 The Court gave no rationale for its holding, and the lower courts
subsequently struggled to supply one.30 The lower courts found it signifi-
cant that the plaintiff in Federated Department Stores had previously pled
and lost federal claims based on the same facts as his removed state
claims.31 It is still unclear whether Federated Department Stores legiti-
mizes removal based on a federal res judicata defense or on some other
ground.
As a consequence of Franchise Tax Board, Federated Department
Stores, and their progeny, the artful pleading doctrine has been signifi-
cantly broadened over the last twelve years, and concomitant restrictions
have been placed on the well-pleaded complaint and master-of-the-com-
plaint rules. In light of these developments, the time is ripe to examine
22. See infra text accompanying notes 47-49.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 45-52.
24. 463 U.S. 1 (1983).
25. Id at 26.
26. Id at 23-24.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 86-96.
28. 452 U.S. 394 (1981).
29. Id at 397 n.2.
30. See infra Part IV.
31. See infra Part IV.
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the propriety of the artful pleading doctrine in its many guises. Part II of
this Article examines the pristine form of the artful pleading doctrine as
exemplified by Avco and concludes that the doctrine is inconsistent with
established law. Part III examines Franchise Tax Board and its progeny
and concludes that expansion of Avco is unjustified. Part IV discusses
Federated Department Stores' application of the artful pleading doctrine
and concludes that Federated Department Stores involves an ill-consid-
ered expansion of the doctrine.
Given the conflict between the artful pleading doctrine and a cen-
tury of settled jurisdictional law, Part V considers whether the tradi-
tional view exemplified by the well-pleaded complaint and master-of-the-
complaint rules or the view espoused by the artful pleading cases is
sounder. The Article concludes that courts should follow traditional ju-
risdictional principles. The artful pleading doctrine should not remain in
any form as an exception to the well-pleaded complaint and master-of-
the-complaint rules.
II. The Preemption Branch of the Artful Pleading Doctrine
A. Birth of the Doctrine
In Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735,32 an employer sought a state
court injunction against a striking labor union. The employer alleged
that the strike violated its collective bargaining agreement with the
union, which contained a no-strike clause and required the union to sub-
mit certain grievances to binding arbitration.33 The union removed the
case to federal court.34
Even though the plaintiff purported to plead only a state law breach
of contract claim based on the collective bargaining agreement, the
Supreme Court held that the case fell within the district court's federal
question jurisdiction.35 In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 36 the
Court had held that section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
32. 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
33. Id. at 558.
34. Id.
35. Although the Court held that the case arose under an "Act of Congress regulating
commerce," id. at 562 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1964)), the Court's holding also implies that
the action arose under federal law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1964), the general federal
question statute. Now that the jurisdictional amount limitations have been excised from sec-
tion 1331, see Pub. L. No. 96-486, § 2(a), 94 Stat. 2369 (1980) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (1988)), section 1337 has ceased to have independent significance and is simply a
more specific application of section 1331. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 8 n.7.
36. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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Act 37 preempted all state claims to enforce collective bargaining agree-
ments and mandated that all such claims be governed by federal common
law.38 Applying Lincoln Mills, the Avco Court held that the plaintiff's
breach of contract claim arose under federal common law and was re-
movable on this basis. 39
The Avco Court explained that it was irrelevant that the specific re-
lief sought by the plaintiff was not available in federal court.4 Federal
courts are precluded from issuing injunctions in labor disputes under sec-
tion 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.41 The Court did not decide whether
a state court applying federal common law to an action for breach of a
collective bargaining agreement would be similarly disabled from issuing
an injunction.42 The Court treated the jurisdictional question as distin-
guishable from the relief question; therefore, once the case was properly
identified as one arising under federal law, it was removable.43 Although
the district court lacked the power to grant the specific relief requested
by the plaintiff, it had the power to grant other relief.44
37. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1952).
38. See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 456-57. Although section 301 simply gave the federal
courts jurisdiction to entertain "[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a
labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce," 29 U.S.C.
§ 185(a) (1952), the Court believed that this jurisdictional grant embodied a congressional
policy that peaceful labor relations would be promoted through the application of a uniform
federal law to all collective bargaining questions. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 455.
39. Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557, 560 (1968). Avco seemingly con-
tradicts two Supreme Court cases decided within the seven years preceding it. In Pan Ameri-
can Petroleum Corp. v. Superior Court, 366 U.S. 656 (1961), the Court held that a state court
had jurisdiction to consider a state claim that was arguably preempted and replaced by a
federal claim that was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. Ia at 662-64.
The Court noted that it would not second-guess the plaintiff's characterization of his claim.
Id. In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), the Court explained that federal
preemption of a state labor claim does not create federal jurisdiction. Ad at 727. Nevertheless,
a number of lower courts anticipated Avco. See Johnson v. England, 356 F.2d 44, 47-48 (9th
Cir.), cert denied, 384 U.S. 961 (1966); Pollio & Son, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters,
242 F. Supp. 684, 684-86 (E.D.N.Y. 1965); Table Talk Pies v. Strauss, 237 F. Supp. 514, 517-
19 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Central Metal Prods. v. International Union, 195 F. Supp. 70, 71-72 (E.D.
Ark. 1961); Fay v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 278, 280-81 (S.D.N.Y.
1951).
40. Avco, 390 U.S. at 561.
41. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1968).
42. Avco, 390 U.S. at 560 n.2.
43. See id. at 561.
44. For example, the district court had the power to grant specific performance of an
agreement to arbitrate, enforcement of an arbitration award, or compensatory damages. See
id Of course, the plaintiff would have been entitled to such relief even if injunctive relief had
been the only relief prayed for in the complaint. See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(c).
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B. The Replacement Preemption Model
A vco, a unanimous decision of the United States Supreme Court, did
not even discuss the well-pleaded complaint and master-of-the-complaint
rules. One must assume that the Court believed the result was obvious
and did not disturb settled law. Avco may appear to be consistent with
the master-of-the-complaint rule. If, as in Avco, the only claim available
to the plaintiff is federal, the plaintiff has no choice but to bring a federal
claim. The master-of-the-complaint rule, therefore, seems to have no ap-
plication. 45 The plaintiff would presumably prefer having his complaint
removed to having his complaint dismissed based on federal
preemption. 46
The well-pleaded complaint rule, which provides that removal is not
permitted based on the assertion of federal defenses, is more difficult to
reconcile with Avco. Prior to Franchise Tax Board, the lower courts at-
tempted to reconcile the well-pleaded complaint rule and the artful
pleading doctrine by distinguishing between two types of federal preemp-
tion.47 The lower courts allowed removal when federal law not only pre-
45. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Sarkisian, 794 F.2d 754, 758 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 885 (1986). Although the Avco branch of the artful pleading doctrine has usually been
applied in preemption cases, it should also apply to all cases in which the plaintiff's only possi-
ble relief is federal. See 14A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21, § 3722, at 273-74 (noting that
removal based on the artful pleading doctrine is appropriate whenever "the only remedy avail-
able to plaintiff is federal, because of preemption or otherwise"). If the plaintiff relies on a
state law theory that does not exist, and federal law supplies a basis for the claim, a federal
court should allow removal based on A vco. See Mechanical Rubber & Supply Co. v. American
Saw & Mfg. Co., 747 F. Supp. 1292, 1295-96 (C.D. Ill. 1990) (allowing removal under federal
antitrust law because plaintiff alleged interstate antitrust violations and state antitrust law ap-
plied only to intrastate violations); La Buhn v. Bulkmatic Transp. Co., 644 F. Supp. 942, 947-
48 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (allowing removal only if state labor claim held not to exist), affd, 865 F.2d
119 (7th Cir. 1988); Fisher v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 228, 229 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (con-
struing a claim as arising under federal law because state law provided no remedy for age
discrimination); In re Wiring Device Antitrust Litig., 498 F. Supp. 79, 82-83 (E.D.N.Y. 1980)
(allowing removal of a claim pled under state antitrust law because the complaint implicated
interstate commerce and state law was limited to transactions in intrastate commerce).
46. See Mary P. Twitchell, Characterizing Federal Claims: Preemption, Removal, and the
Arising-Under Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 812, 824-25 (1986).
47. Some lower courts did not distinguish between types of preemption and allowed re-
moval without regard to whether federal law provided replacements for preempted state
claims. See Gunter v. AGO Int'l B.V., 533 F. Supp. 86, 88-90 (N.D. Fla. 1981); Palm Beach
Co. v. Journeymen's and Prod. Allied Servs. Int'l Union Local 157, 519 F. Supp. 705, 708
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); Billy Jack for Her, Inc. v. New York Coat Workers' Union Local 1-35, 511
F. Supp. 1180, 1187 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Bailey v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 467 F. Supp.
1139, 1141-42 (C.D. Ill. 1979); New York v. Local 144, 410 F. Supp. 225, 229 (S.D.N.Y.
1976); Ulichny v. General Elec. Co., 309 F. Supp. 437, 440 (N.D.N.Y. 1970). The Billy Jack
case articulated a choice-of-law theory that is a precursor of the complete preemption model
suggested by later Supreme Court cases. 511 F. Supp. at 1187; see infra text accompanying
notes 92-93.
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empted state claims but also replaced them with parallel federal claims.48
When federal preemption simply extinguished the plaintiff's state claims,
the lower courts viewed preemption as defensive and did not permit re-
moval.49 I shall refer to the view that removal is permitted only if federal
48. See Minot Builders Supply Ass'n v. Teamsters Local 123, 703 F.2d 324, 327 (8th Cir.
1983); Fristoe v. Reynolds Metals Co., 615 F.2d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir. 1980); Sheeran v. Gen-
eral Elec. Co., 593 F.2d 93, 96-97 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979); North Am.
Phillips Corp. v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 579 F.2d 229, 233-34 (2d Cir. 1978); American
Synthetic Rubber Corp. v. Louisville & N.R.R., 422 F.2d 462,465-66 (6th Cir. 1970); Calhoon
v. Bonnabel, 560 F. Supp. 101, 107-08 & n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Holder v. Pet Bakery Div., 558
F. Supp. 287, 288-89 (N.D. Ga. 1982); Alameda Room, Inc. v. Pitta, 538 F. Supp. 1072, 1075-
77 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Neiger v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 470 F. Supp. 622, 625-27
(W.D. Mo. 1979); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Jackson County v. First Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n of Huntsville, 446 F. Supp. 210, 212 (N.D. Ala. 1978); Bains v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.,
440 F. Supp. 15, 16 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Papadopoulos v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 410 F. Supp. 217,
218-19 (D.D.C. 1976); Rettig v. Arlington Heights Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 405 F. Supp. 819,
822-23 (N.D. Il. 1975); Bowman, Inc. v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 403 F. Supp. 389, 390-91 (W.D.
Pa. 1975); Sweeney v. Morgan Drive Away, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 1216, 1217-18 (D. Colo. 1975);
Oquendo v. Dorado Beach Hotel Corp., 382 F. Supp. 516, 517-19 (D.P.R. 1974); Day-Brite
Lighting Div. v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 303 F. Supp. 1086, 1092-93 (N.D. Miss.
1969); Roper Corp. v. Office & Professional Employees Int'l Union, 300 F. Supp. 105, 106-07
(S.D. Ohio 1969); Espino v. Volkswagen, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 979, 983 (D.P.R. 1968).
A number of cases prior to Franchise Tax Board permitted removal of state claims that
had been preempted by federal law and replaced by federal claims that were within the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of a federal agency. See Beers v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 703 F.2d 425,
427 (9th Cir. 1983); Schroeder v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 702 F.2d 189, 191 (9th Cir.
1983); McKinney v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 624 F.2d 745, 747 (6th Cir. 1980).
These cases may be viewed as an application, rather than a rejection, of the replacement pre-
emption model. See infra text accompanying notes 153-157.
49. See First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Brown, 707 F.2d 1217, 1220 (11th Cir. 1983);
Trent Realty Assocs. v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 657 F.2d 29, 34-35 (3d Cir. 1981);
Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 635 F.2d 797, 800-03 (10th Cir. 1980); La
Chemise Lacoste v. Alligator Co., 506 F.2d 339, 345-46 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
937 (1975); Tom Lazio Fish Co. v. Castle & Cooke, Inc., 557 F. Supp. 559, 561-62 (N.D. Cal.
1983); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Schwartz, 550 F. Supp. 1312, 1313-14 (S.D. Fla. 1982);
Charrier v. Bell, 547 F. Supp. 580, 582-83 (M.D. La. 1982); Eureka Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Flynn, 534 F. Supp. 479, 481 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Schultz v. Coral Gables Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 505 F. Supp. 1003, 1008-11 (S.D. Fla. 1981); Turner v. Bell Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
490 F. Supp. 104, 105 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Long Island R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 484 F.
Supp. 1290, 1293 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Mabray v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 480 F. Supp. 1240, 1244-
45 (W.D. Tenn. 1979); City of Winston-Salem v. Chauffeurs Local Union No. 391, 470 F.
Supp. 442, 447-48 (M.D.N.C. 1979); Nevada v. King, 463 F. Supp. 749, 751-52 (D. Nev.
1979); Marquette Natl Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 422 F. Supp. 1346, 1352-53 (D. Minn. 1976);
Committee of Interns & Residents v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 420 F. Supp. 826,
831-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Gatch v. Hennepin Broadcasting Assocs., 349 F. Supp. 1180, 1181
(D. Minn. 1972); Denver Union Stock Yard Co. v. Litvak Meat Co., 295 F. Supp. 809, 811-12
(D. Colo. 1968); see also Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co. v. Lodges 1088 & 1142, 535 F. Supp. 167,
170-71 (D.R.I. 1982) (remanding a state labor law claim because the complaint did not state a
valid claim under federal law); Guinasso v. Pacific First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 656 F.2d
1364, 1367 (9th Cir. 1981) (denying removal because "federal law provides neither the right
asserted nor the remedy sought by the present plaintiffs"), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982);
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law replaces the preempted state claim as the replacement preemption
model.
C. Avco as a Departure from Established Law
The replacement preemption model is unsuccessful in its attempt to
harmonize Avco with traditional jurisdictional law. The master-of-the-
complaint rule gives the plaintiff the right to insist on asserting his poten-
tial state claims and only his potential state claims. In cases in which
federal preemption is merely arguable, unlike Avco, it is important that
the plaintiff have the right to choose the law upon which he will rely. 50 If
the plaintiff insists on asserting only state claims, federal preemption is
defensive whether or not the plaintiff has access to other federal claims
that he chooses not to assert. 51 If the defendant's preemption challenge
is successful, the plaintiff simply loses. The well-pleaded complaint rule
requires that removal not be permitted based on the defense of federal
preemption.52
First Nat'l Bank v. Aberdeen Nat'l Bank, 627 F.2d 843, 853 (8th Cir. 1980) (noting that Avco
allows removal only when a state claim has been preempted and "'replaced by a federal right
of action'" (quoting 14 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 3722, at 80 (Supp. 1978))), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1018 (1981); Smart v. First Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n, 500 F. Supp. 1147, 1155 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (noting that the instant case was
unlike Avco in which "the facts alleged in plaintiff's complaint were sufficient to support a
federal cause of action"); California v. Glendale Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 475 F. Supp. 728,
732 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (distinguishing cases in which "the facts alleged by the plaintiff actually
stated a federal and not a state claim"); New York v. Local 1115 Joint Bd., 412 F. Supp. 720,
723 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (noting that when "superseding federal law does not replace rights for-
merly granted by State law, it is illogical to say that the litigant's claim is really predicated on a
body of law which grants him no rights").
50. See generally Twitchell, supra note 46, at 857-70 (discussing resolution of the removal
and preemption questions in cases in which preemption presents a substantial issue).
51. See Sullivan v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc., 813 F.2d 1368, 1372 n.5 (9th Cir.) (noting
that "the doctrinal distinction between preemption with and without a federal remedy appears
to rationalize a narrow exception to the rule that removal cannot be obtained by a federal
defense"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987); Thomas Yamachika, The Law of Federal "Com-
plete Preemption" A New Brand of Federal-State Conflict, 41 LAB. L.J. 337, 349 (1990) (not-
ing that the artful pleading doctrine involves an inference that "Congress intended to alter the
well-pleaded complaint rule"); Tom M. Williams, Note, Federated Department Stores v. Moi-
tie: Removal and Relitigation Reappraised, 1983 WIs. L. REV. 989, 1001; Eric J. Moss, Note,
The Breadth of Complete Preemption: Limiting the Doctrine to its Roots, 76 VA. L. REv. 1601,
1612 (1990) (arguing that "in Avco, the Court made a substantial departure from the estab-
lished well-pleaded complaint rule").
52. The fact that some lower courts refused to follow Avco indicates its departure from
established precedent. In Washington v. American League, 460 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1972), the
plaintiff asserted state claims that could also have been brought under the Sherman Antitrust
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970), and the defendant removed. The Ninth Circuit held that federal
jurisdiction did not exist even if federal antitrust law preempted the state claims (which is
clearly not true today, see California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101 (1989)), because
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In order to decide the removal issue, the state court must assess the
validity of the preemption defense based on federal law. Indeed, the
plaintiff may have chosen the state forum in order to enable a state deci-
sionmaker to rule on the preemption question. There is, however, noth-
ing unusual or improper about this result. 53 The well-pleaded complaint
rule always requires a state court to decide the validity of federal defenses
whenever the plaintiff pleads only state claims.
Moreover, when the plaintiff adheres solely to'his potential state
claims, he is not abusing the dual court system. If the preemption de-
fense succeeds, the state trial court can decide whether to permit the
plaintiff to amend his complaint and assert any federal claims he had
originally chosen to forego.5 4 If the state court permits amendment, the
defendant can then remove on the basis of federal question jurisdiction.55
If the state court does not permit amendment, the consequence of the
"[flederal preemption is a matter of defense to a state law claim, and not a ground for re-
moval." American League, 460 F.2d at 660. The court did not believe it was inconsistent to
disallow removal based upon the kind of replacement preemption that had been present in
Avco itself.
In Illinois v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 677 F.2d 571 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1049 (1982), the Seventh Circuit took a stronger position. In that case, the State of Illinois
sued Kerr-McGee, which operated facilities registered with the Atomic Energy Commission,
in its own courts and alleged improper disposal of waste under Illinois law. Id. at 573. Kerr-
McGee claimed that the state claims were preempted by federal law and that removal was
justified. Id at 574. The Seventh Circuit disagreed and viewed preemption as a potential
federal defense that did not justify removal. See id at 577. The Seventh Circuit did not ex-
amine whether federal law provided a replacement for the preempted state claims. The court
viewedAvco as in disrepute and confined it to labor law because the Avco Court could not have
intended "to effect a wholesale expansion of the federal courts' removal jurisdiction without so
much as mentioning over eighty years of judicial precedent to the contrary." Id at 577 n.10.
With respect to Avco and its progeny, the Seventh Circuit stated: "To the extent these deci-
sions are in conflict with our decision here, we decline to follow them." Id. at 577; see also
Schmidt v. National Org. for Women, 562 F. Supp. 210, 214 (N.D. Fla. 1983) (noting that
"the more recent and better reasoned cases hold that preemption is a defense which does not
confer removal jurisdiction"); Chappell v. SCA Servs., 540 F. Supp. 1087, 1095 n.3 (C.D. Ill.
1982) (same); Coulston v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 423 F. Supp. 882, 883-84 (E.D. Pa.
1976) (holding, without any reference to Avco, that potential preemption of a state labor claim
by federal law did not justify removal); Lowe v. Trans World Airlines, 396 F. Supp. 9, 12
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding that federal preemption always arises as a defense and does not
support removal).
53. See infra Part V.
54. Cf FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a) (requiring leave of court to amend a complaint after the
answer is served but noting that "leave shall be freely given when justice so requires").
55. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1988) (granting leave to remove a case that was not initially
removable so long as the removal petition is filed within thirty days of the filing of the
amended pleading that made the case removable); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Sarkisian, 794 F.2d
754, 758 n.6 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 885 (1986); cf Sarnelli v. Tickle, 556 F. Supp.
557, 562 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (noting that removal is only appropriate after a state court has
decided the question of federal preemption in the defendant's favor).
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plaintiff's decision to forego federal claims depends on the requirements
of the state's res judicata law.56
Res judicata will generally apply if: the potential federal claim is
within the concurrent jurisdiction of the state courts;57 the state court
considers dismissal for failure to state a claim to be a decision on the
merits for purposes of preclusion;58 and all claims arising out of the same
transaction as the plaintiff's original claim are barred under the state
court's res judicata rules.59 If the plaintiff is not barred from asserting
his potential federal claim in a second lawsuit, this result should be ad-
dressed pursuant to the state's res judicata law rather than federal re-
moval law.6°
56. The preclusive effect of a state court's judgment upon a subsequent case is governed
by the law of the rendering state. If the second case is in a different state tribunal, the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, requires the second state to give the same
preclusive effect to the judgment as would the courts of the rendering state. See, e.g., Fauntle-
roy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 236-37 (1908); Hampton v. M'Connel, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 234, 235
(1818). If the second forum is federal, the Full Faith and Credit Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738
(1988), requires the federal court to give such preclusive effect to the judgment as would the
courts of the rendering state. See, e.g., Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S.
75, 84 (1984).
57. There is generally no preclusion based on res judicata for failing to bring claims that
are not within the forum's subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Marrese v. American Acad-
emy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 382 (1985). The states have the power, however,
to preclude claims that are exclusively federal unless Congress intended an exception to the
Full Faith and Credit Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988). See Marrese, 470 U.S. at 383-86.
58. The federal rule is that a dismissal for failure to state a claim is a decision on the
merits for preclusion purposes unless the district court specifies otherwise. See FED. R. CIV.
P. 41(b); Federated 'Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 399 n.3 (1981). The states are
split on this question. Compare, e.g., Keidatz v. Albany, 249 P.2d 264, 265-66 (Cal. 1952)
(holding that a dismissal for failure to state a claim is not preclusive) and Hacker v. Beck, 91
N.E.2d 832, 834 (Mass. 1950) (same) and Rost v. Kroke, 262 N.W. 450, 452 (Minn. 1935)
(same) and Allston v. Incorporated Village, 267 N.Y.S.2d 564, 565-66 (App. Div. 1966) (same)
with Jefferson v. Greater Anchorage Area Borough, 451 P.2d 730, 732-33 (Alaska 1969) (hold-
ing that a dismissal for failure to state a claim is on the merits for purposes of preclusion) and
Greene v. Central of Ga. Ry., 38 S.E. 360, 360-61 (Ga. 1901) (same) and Lamb v. McConkey,
40 N.W. 77, 78 (Iowa 1888) (same) and Powell v. Chastain, 359 P.2d 336, 339 (Okla. 1961)
(same). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 19 cmt. d (1982) (adopting the
federal rule).
59. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982).
60. Cf. Twitchell, supra note 46, at 826-27 (noting that if the artful pleading doctrine is
derived "solely out of a sense of fairness to defendant, it would seem fair to permit plaintiff to
press her state claim in state court, using principles of waiver and res judicata to protect de-
fendant from additional litigation of any federal claims plaintiff might subsequently assert"
(footnote omitted)).
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D. Justifying Avco on Grounds of Necessity
In Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Sarkisian,61 the Second Circuit sug-
gested a rationale for Avco in light of settled jurisdictional law. The court
acknowledged that federal preemption would appear always to be a de-
fense. 62 The court noted, however, that it might be necessary to allow
removal because, under certain circumstances, the state court might not
feel compelled to decide the preemption question. 63 Consider the follow-
ing scenario: The plaintiff has asserted only a state claim that is arguably
preempted by federal law. If it is preempted, the state claim is replaced
by a parallel federal claim, and the state court has concurrent jurisdiction
over the replacement federal claim.64 If the state court follows the fed-
eral rules that the plaintiff is not required to plead law65 and may receive
the relief to which he is entitled regardless of his prayer,66 and if the
plaintiff establishes the facts pled in his complaint, he will necessarily be
entitled to relief from the state court. Whether that relief flows from
state or federal law may seem irrelevant to the state court. As a conse-
quence, the state court may refuse to decide the preemption question. 67
61. 794 F.2d 754 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 885 (1986).
62. See id at 758 n.6.
63. See id
64. There was, for example, concurrent jurisdiction over the replacement federal claim in
Avco itself. See Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 506 (1962). Some have
argued that the strongest case for artful pleading removal occurs when state claims are pre-
empted by claims that are exclusively federal. See Salveson v. Western States Bankcard Ass'n,
525 F. Supp. 566, 572 (N.D. Cal. 1981), affd inpart and rev'd inpart, 731 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir.
1984); Stanley Blumenfeld, Jr., Comment, Artful Pleading and Removal Jurisdiction: Ferreting
Out the True Nature of a Claim, 35 UCLA L. Rv. 315, 341 (1987). In this case, however,
federal pre-emption can only be a defense because the state court is not empowered to grant
relief on any federal claims that might exist.
65. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." A federal complaint "should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove
no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). In a state court applying this standard, a plaintiff might fail to
plead a federal claim over which the court has concurrent jurisdiction and still obtain relief
under the federal claim that replaces the preempted state claim. Cf Twitchell, supra note 46,
at 824-25 (noting that liberal pleading rules may result in ambiguity regarding the legal bases
of claims and may require courts to look beyond the face of the complaint to determine under
whose law a particular claim arises).
66. See FED. R. Civ. P. 54(c) (providing that "every final judgment shall grant the relief
to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded
such relief in the party's pleadings").
67. In Oseekey v. Spaulding Fibre Co., 655 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D.N.Y. 1987), the plaintiff
filed a state claim for breach of an employment agreement. The defendant moved to dismiss
on the ground that section 514(a) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(a) (1982), preempted the state claim. Oseekey, 655 F. Supp. at 1120. The plaintiff
argued that even if ERISA preempted the state claim, ERISA provided a replacement claim
January 1993] ARTFUL PLEADING DOCTRINE
If federal preemption applies, the plaintiff will have received relief in
state court based on the replacement federal claim, and the defendant
will have been unfairly deprived of his right to remove the case on federal
question grounds.68
As the Second Circuit noted in Travelers, this rationale is something
of an after-the-fact justification of Avco, since Avco has been applied to
allow removal of claims that, if deemed federal, are within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the federal courts.69 In such instances, the state court
must decide the preemption question because it lacks the power to grant
relief under federal law. Moreover, even if the replacement federal claim
is within the concurrent jurisdiction of the state courts, the state courts
should have a duty to decide the federal preemption question to protect
the defendant's federal rights. This duty is simply an extension of the
supremacy of federal law.70 It is similar to the duty imposed on state
courts to entertain federal question cases71 or to follow federal proce-
dures when necessary to protect federal rights. 72 Therefore, Avco cannot
be justified as necessary to protect the defendant's right to removal.
E. Conclusion
The attempts to justify Avco in light of established precedent are
unsuccessful. A vco contradicts the well-pleaded complaint and master-
of-the-complaint rules. Either the Avco decision is misguided or these
rules must be abandoned in whole or in part.
that was within the state court's concurrent jurisdiction. Id. The state court denied the mo-
tion to dismiss and does not appear to have decided the preemption question. See id. The
defendant removed, and the district court held that because ERISA supplied an alternative
basis for his claim, removal jurisdiction was proper. Id. at 1122.
68. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Sarkisian, 794 F.2d 754, 758 n.6 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 885 (1986).
69. See id.; In re Snap-On Tools Corp., 720 F.2d 654, 655 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (allowing
removal of a patent claim that was exclusively federal).
70. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
71. In Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), the Supreme Court held that state courts must
entertain federal claims over which they have jurisdiction as long as they entertain similar
claims arising under state law. Id. at 394.
72. See, e.g., Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988) (holding that Wisconsin may not
apply its notice of claim statute to a federal civil rights action filed in state court); Dice v.
Akron, C. & Y.R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 362-63 (1952) (requiring state courts to grant a jury trial in
actions arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1952)).
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I. Potential Expansion of the Preemption Branch of the
Artful Pleading Doctrine
A. Franchise Tax Board and the Complete Preemption Model
In Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust,73
the Supreme Court paved the way for an expansion of the artful pleading
doctrine. The Franchise Tax Board, a California governmental agency,
brought suit in state court seeking to levy against the assets of a trust that
provided vacations to union members in accordance with a collective
bargaining agreement. The levy was designed to satisfy the personal tax
liabilities of certain union members. The Board based this action on the
provisions of the California Tax Code requiring obligors of delinquent
taxpayers to forward assets owed the taxpayers to the state. 74
The Trust removed the case to federal court relying in part on the
artful pleading doctrine.75 The Trust argued that the Board relied on
state law that related to an employee benefit plan and was therefore pre-
empted by section 514(a) of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA). 76 The Trust contended that such preemption pro-
vided a basis for removal. 77 The Supreme Court did not agree with the
Trust's analysis and held that the case did not fall within the district
court's removal jurisdiction.78
One portion of the Court's opinion in Franchise Tax Board seemed
to accept the replacement preemption model of artful pleading removal.
For removal to be proper under this model, ERISA would have had to
preempt the state claims and replace them with federal claims.79 The
Court noted that ERISA did not provide a federal claim to the Franchise
Tax Board because state agencies do not have standing to enforce ER-
ISA.80 As a consequence, any federal preemption of the Franchise Tax
Board's claim was purely defensive and did not supply a ground for
removal.81
73. 463 U.S. 1 (1983).
74. Id at 4-5.
75. Id at 7.
76. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982).
77. See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 24.
78. Id at 27-28.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 47-49.
80. See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 25.
81. See id at 26 (distinguishing Avco on the ground that "ERISA does not provide an
alternative cause of action in favor of the State to enforce its rights"); Segreti, The Federal
Preemption Question, supra note 17, at 692 (arguing that "the Franchise Tax Board decision
permits federal jurisdiction only if [federal law] replace[s] the state cause of action").
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Other language in Franchise Tax Board, however, suggests a differ-
ent reason for denying removal. The Court explained that the result in
Avco was based on the fact that "the preemptive force of § 301 is so pow-
erful as to displace entirely any state cause of action. ' 82 The Court also
noted that removal is proper whenever "a federal cause of action com-
pletely preempts a state cause of action."' 83 From this perspective, the
Court denied removal because the preemptive scope of ERISA was not
comparable to that of section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act.84 The opinion suggests that removal may turn on the character of
federal preemption rather than on whether federal law provides replace-
ments for preempted state claims. I shall refer to this theory as the com-
plete preemption model.8 5
The scope of "complete preemption" is not clear. Because federal
law is supreme, 86 "state law is preempted if that law actually conflicts
with federal law."' 87 State law is also preempted when it "stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."' 88 Finally, even if there is no direct or implicit conflict be-
tween federal and state law, state law is preempted "if federal law so
thoroughly occupies a legislative field as to make reasonable the inference
that Congress 'left no room for the States to supplement it.' "89 In the
context of removal jurisdiction, "complete preemption" presumably re-
fers to Congress's occupation of an entire field of law.90
The complete preemption model is a more severe departure from the
well-pleaded complaint and master-of-the-complaint rules than the re-
placement preemption model. Under the replacement preemption
model, it may be argued that the plaintiff's claims are necessarily fed-
eral.91 The complete preemption model, which requires only that Con-
82. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 23.
83. Id. at 24.
84. See id. at 24-26.
85. The courts often use the phrase "complete preemption" to identify any removal based
on federal preemption of state law. See, e.g., Bartholet v. Reishauer A.G., 953 F.2d 1073, 1075
(7th Cir. 1992). As used herein, the term refers only to the complete preemption model de-
scribed in the text.
86. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
87. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2617 (1992).
88. California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 581 (1987) (quoting
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984)) (citations omitted).
89. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2617 (quoting Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan v. De la Cuesta, 458
U.S. 141, 153 (1982) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))).
90. See Deford v. Soo Line R.R., 867 F.2d 1080, 1085-86 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S.
927 (1989); Graf v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 790 F.2d 1341, 1345 (7th Cir. 1986); Robinson v.
Eichler, 795 F. Supp. 1253, 1259-60 (D. Conn. 1992).
91. See supra text accompanying note 45.
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gress have occupied the entire field of law into which the plaintiff's
claims fall, allows removal in cases in which the plaintiff does not have
any federal claim.
One justification of the complete preemption model is based on the
order in which the preemption and federal claim questions are addressed.
If it is first decided that Congress has completely preempted a particular
area of the law, any claim that the plaintiff has must necessarily be fed-
eral. Approaching the matter in this order, the plaintiff's claim might be
viewed as federal because federal law will determine whether he has any
basis for relief.92 This explanation of the complete preemption model has
been labeled the choice-of-law theory.93
The choice-of-law theory cannot reconcile the conflict between the
complete preemption model and established precedent. It allows re-
moval in cases in which it is clear that the plaintiff does not have a fed-
eral claim. For a plaintiff to gain access to a federal forum on federal
question grounds, he must plead a federal claim whose existence is fairly
arguable. 94 The complete preemption model does not require the exist-
ence of a fairly arguable federal claim as a precondition of removal. Be-
cause the scope of original and removal jurisdiction are virtually
coextensive, 95 the defendant should not be able to remove a case that the
plaintiff had no right to bring in federal court in the first instance. 96
92. See Graf, 790 F.2d at 1345; Billy Jack for Her, Inc. v. New York Coat Workers'
Union Local 1-35, 511 F. Supp. 1180, 1186-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); A. Mark Segreti, Jr., Vesting
the Whole "Arising Under" Power of the District Courts in Federal Preemption Cases, 37 OKLA.
L. REV. 539, 551 (1984) [hereinafter Segreti, Vesting the Whole]; Richard E. Levy, Note, Fed-
eral Preemption, Removal Jurisdiction, and the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule, 51 U. CHi. L.
REv. 634, 663-64 (1984).
93. See Billy Jack, 511 F. Supp. at 1187.
94. If the plaintiff's federal claim is frivolous, his complaint will be dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. If the plaintiff pleads a fairly arguable federal claim that is ulti-
mately determined not to exist, the federal court has subject matter jurisdiction and the dismis-
sal is on the merits. See, eg., Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536 (1974); Oneida Indian
Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666 (1974); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946).
95. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1988).
96. See Moss, supra note 51, at 1638 (arguing that artful pleading removal should be
limited to cases of replacement preemption). Allowing removal when the plaintiff has no argu-
able federal claim also conflicts with Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478
U.S. 804 (1986), which held that a state law claim alleging violation of a federal statute did not
arise under federal law because the federal statute did not provide the plaintiff with a private
right of action. See supra note 10. The Thompson case has been relied upon in the artful
pleading context to deny removal in cases in which federal law did not supply replacement
claims for preempted state claims. See Ethridge v. Harbor House Restaurant, 861 F.2d 1389,
1396 (9th Cir. 1988); Willy v. Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d 1160, 1165-66 (5th Cir. 1988); Utley v.
Varian Assocs., 811 F.2d 1279, 1282-83 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 824 (1987).
January 1993] ARTFUL PLEADING DOCTRINE
The complete preemption model also makes bad law because it is
difficult to apply. When federal preemption exists, it bars not only the
plaintiff's claim but all claims that are of the same nature, however de-
fined. Even in the most pervasively regulated fields, federal preemption
is seldom totally complete. 97 There is usually some related area in which
state law may operate. Thus, resolution of the removal inquiry depends
on how one categorizes the field of law that the case implicates. It is
difficult, however, to supply principled grounds on which to make such
judgments.
For example, as seen in Avco, state claims for breach of collective
bargaining agreements are preempted by section 301 of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act.98 Therefore, if Avco is explained pursuant to the
complete preemption model, such state claims are removable because
federal preemption is complete. Federal labor law does not, however,
preempt all state law affecting labor-management relations or even all
state law relating to agreements between labor and management. State
labor claims that are not based on collective bargaining agreements con-
tinue to survive. 99 Federal preemption is complete only if the universe of
claims is defined as those relating to collective bargaining agreements, a
choice that appears arbitrary.
Perhaps the Court in Franchise Tax Board used the language of
complete preemption to refer to situations in which federal law not only
preempts state law in a given area but also provides replacement federal
claims. 10 If this is the case, Franchise Tax Board adopts the replace-
ment preemption model. Much of the language in Franchise Tax Board
lends itself to this view. In articulating the complete preemption notion,
the Court stated that removal is proper whenever "a federal cause of
action completely preempts a state cause of action."' 01 Because the
Court referred to the "federal cause of action" as the preempting force
rather than federal law generally, it may have been attempting to limit
the case to replacement preemption. For example, the Court's discussion
of whether ERISA preemption was complete on the instant facts empha-
97. See Bartholet v. Reishauer A.G., 953 F.2d 1073, 1075 (7th Cir. 1992).
98. See supra text accompanying note 38.
99. See Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 406-10 (1988) (holding
that state retaliatory discharge claims are not preempted by federal law); International Bhd. of
Elec. Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 858 (1987) (noting that state labor claims are barred
only if they are "inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of [a] labor contract"
(quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213 (1985))).
100. See Bartholet, 953 F.2d at 1075 (noting that complete preemption is a "misnomer"
and that "[p]reemption is what wipes out state law, but the foundation for removal is the
creation of federal law to replace state law").
101. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
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sized that the state of California lacked standing to assert claims under
ERISA. 0 2
It is difficult to understand the result in Franchise Tax Board unless
the case is a confirmation of the replacement preemption model. The
Court resolved the jurisdictional issue without reaching the merits of the
preemption question. If the Court was applying the replacement pre-
emption model, its ability to resolve the jurisdictional question without
reaching the merits of the preemption question is entirely understanda-
ble.103 Once the Court determined that the plaintiff did not have a claim
under ERISA, the case clearly had to be dismissed for lack of jurisdic-
tion. If the Court was applying a new complete preemption model, how-
ever, it would have had to decide not only whether the plaintiff's state
claims were preempted, but also whether they arose in an area that was
completely preempted by federal law.'°4 The Court's failure to reach the
preemption question suggests that it was applying the replacement pre-
emption model.
B. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor
The Court's decision in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor 105
lends further support to the view that Franchise Tax Board merely con-
firmed the replacement preemption model. In Taylor, an insured pled a
number of contract and tort claims in state court under state law relating
to an insurance company's failure to pay benefits pursuant to a disability
102. See id. at 25-26.
103. See id at 7. Prior to the Court's decision in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 481
U.S. 41 (1987), the scope of ERISA preemption was generally unclear. The lower courts in
Franchise Tax Board split on the merits of the preemption question, see Franchise Tax Bd., 463
U.S. at 7, and the Ninth Circuit's finding that preemption existed was by a divided court.
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 679 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1982),
vacated, 463 U.S. 1 (1983). It can be argued that removal is never proper under the artful
pleading doctrine unless federal preemption is clear. Under this rule, the plaintiff would be
allowed to stay in state court whenever he has a fairly arguable state claim. This rule would
mirror federal jurisdiction principles. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. This view
was squarely rejected, however, in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66
(1987).
104. The Court may have resolved the jurisdictional inquiry by determining that any fed-
eral preemption was less than complete. In that event, it would have been unnecessary, even
under the complete preemption model, to determine whether the state claims were in fact
preempted. The Court noted that ERISA did not entirely preempt state law relating to em-
ployee benefit plans because it explicitly rejected preemption with regard to state laws gov-
erning insurance, banking, and securities. See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 25. Franchise
Tax Board cannot be based on this theory, however, because the Court allowed removal of a
state claim preempted by ERISA despite the disclaimer in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v.
Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987). See infira text accompanying notes 112-113.
105. 481 U.S. 58 (1987).
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policy that was established under an employee benefit plan.'0 6 The de-
fendants, the employer and the insurance company, removed the suit to
federal court.' 0 7 The Supreme Court held that removal was proper.'0 8
The Court framed the issue as "whether these state common law
claims are not only preempted by ERISA, but also displaced by ERISA's
civil enforcement provision."' 09 The Court noted that because the plain-
tiff's state claims related to an employee benefit plan they were pre-
empted unless they came within ERISA's disclaimer of preemption for
state laws governing insurance, banking, or securities. The Court held
that the plaintiff's state claims were preempted because they were based
upon laws of general application rather than laws specifically governing
the field of insurance."10 The Court also noted that ERISA's civil en-
forcement provisions provided the plaintiff with a federal claim to re-
cover the insurance benefits he sought."'
Taylor is easily explained under the replacement preemption model.
Federal law not only preempted state law but also provided the plaintiff
with a replacement federal claim. Taylor is distinguishable from
Franchise Tax Board only on the ground that the facts pled in Taylor
stated a viable claim under federal law. ' 2
It is difficult to explain Taylor as a case applying the complete pre-
emption model. If the Court had attempted a complete preemption in-
quiry, it would have had to determine whether the relevant class of
claims related to employee benefit plans outside the insurance, banking,
and securities areas or to employee benefit plans generally. Only if the
former view was accepted would the claims in Taylor have been com-
pletely preempted. This was an inquiry, however, that the Court saw no
need to make.' 3
106. Id. at 60-61.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 67.
109. Id. at 60.
110. Id. at 62.
111. Id. at 62-63.
112. See id. at 64-65.
113. The Taylor Court also allowed removal because it believed that Congress's intent was
to allow removal. See id. at 64-66 (noting that the legislative history treated ERISA claims "as
arising under the laws of the United States in similar fashion to those brought under section
301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947" (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1974))). A number of courts have imposed a Congressional intent
requirement before allowing removal under the replacement preemption model. See Aaron v.
National Union Fire Ins. Co., 876 F.2d 1157, 1165 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1074
(1990); Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R., 858 F.2d 936, 942 (3d Cir.
1988); Beers v. North Am. Van Lines, 836 F.2d 910, 913 n.3 (5th Cir. 1988); Boyle v. MTV
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C. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams
The complete preemption model received a new lease on life in Cat-
erpillar, Inc. v. Williams.u 4 In that case, a group of employees filed suit
in state court claiming that their employer had promised them long-term
employment outside the context of the company's collective bargaining
contract.1 5 The employer removed the suit to federal court on the
ground that the suit was preempted by section 301 of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act.1 6 The Supreme Court held that removal was
improper.' 17
Caterpillar might be read as simply a confirmation of the replace-
ment preemption model. Analyzing the complaint, the Court noted that
the plaintiffs had alleged a breach of the company's individual contracts
with them, not a breach of any provision of the collective bargaining
agreement. As a consequence, the plaintiffs' claims could not have been
brought under section 301 because that section only enforces rights de-
riving from a collective bargaining agreement.'1 Having found that no
federal claim covered this dispute, the Court dismissed for lack of juris-
diction without determining whether the plaintiffs' state claims were in
fact preempted.'1 9
However, portions of the Caterpillar opinion portend a revival of the
complete preemption model. The Court framed the issue as "whether
respondents' state law complaint for breach of individual employment
contracts is completely preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act."120 In discussing the foundation of the artful pleading
doctrine, the Court stated: "Once an area of state law has been com-
pletely preempted, any claim purportedly based on that preempted state
law is considered, from its inception, a federal claim, and therefore arises
under federal law."121 Unlike Franchise Tax Board, Caterpillar did not
emphasize that a federal cause of action, rather than federal law gener-
ally, must preempt a state claim for that claim to be considered
federal. 122
Networks, Inc., 766 F. Supp. 809, 815 (N.D. Cal. 1991); National Mills, Inc. v. Consolidated
Freightways Corp., No. Civ.A.90-2399-V, 1991 WL 33467 (D. Kan. Feb. 12, 1991).
114. 482 U.S. 386 (1987).
115. Id at 388-89.
116. Id. at 390.
117. Id at 399.
118. Id. at 394.
119. Id. at 394-99.
120. Id at 388.
121. Id. at 393.
122. See supra text accompanying note 101.
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Although the Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit, the Court felt it nec-
essary to correct the Ninth Circuit's articulation of the replacement pre-
emption model:
The Court of Appeals ... appears to have held that a case may
not be removed to federal court on the ground that it is completely
preempted unless the federal cause of action relied upon provides the
plaintiff with a remedy....
This analysis is squarely contradicted by our decision in Avco
Corp. v. Machinists, 390 U.S. 557 (1968). We there held that a § 301
claim was properly removed to federal court although, at the time, the
relief sought by the plaintiff could be obtained only in state court....
Thus, although we affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment, we re-
ject its reasoning insofar as it is inconsistent with Avco. 123
Although this statement is a dictum, because the Court affirmed the
Ninth Circuit's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, it appears to be a rejec-
tion of the replacement preemption model.124 If so, the Caterpillar
Court's refusal to decide whether the state claim at issue was preempted
cannot be attributed to the theory that it was unnecessary to decide this
question once it was clear that no federal claim existed. 125 Perhaps the
Court believed that complete preemption applied only to claims within
the scope of collective bargaining agreements and not to claims for
breaches of individual contracts with employers. Having decided that
the plaintiffs' claims did not fall within the scope of complete preemp-
tion, the Court may have found it unnecessary to consider whether the
plaintiffs' claims were actually preempted on some other basis.
In light of the fact that the Court had embraced the replacement
preemption model just two months earlier in its unanimous Taylor deci-
sion, a more limited reading of Caterpillar is preferable.1 26 The Court
may have meant that the replacement preemption model allows removal
whenever federal law arguably replaces the preempted state claim and
that federal jurisdiction is not defeated if the plaintiff's federal claim is
ultimately held not to exist. This view is in accord with accepted law,' 2 7
and constitutes a legitimate application of the replacement preemption
model.
123. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 391 n.4 (1987).
124. See Blumenfeld, supra note 64, at 335, 351 n.175.
125. See Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 397-98 (noting that defendant would be able to urge fed-
eral preemption on remand).
126. See Tomlin v. Carson Helicopters, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 248, 250 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (re-
jecting "any suggestion that Caterpillar abrogates the requirements established by the Court
two months earlier in [Taylor]").
127. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, the Caterpillar Court seemed to misapprehend the Ninth
Circuit's exposition of the replacement preemption model. Had the
Ninth Circuit suggested that removal is allowed only when federal law
provides the exact relief requested by the plaintiff, the Court would have
been correct in recognizing that this statement contradicts Avco. 128 The
Ninth Circuit did not, however, make such a statement. It suggested
only that federal law must provide the plaintiff with a claim to replace
the preempted state claim.129 If the Court believed this statement was
incorrect, it misread Avco. The Avco Court expressly stated that,
although the plaintiff could not get his requested relief in federal court,
he had viable federal claims and the federal courts had the power to
grant other sufficient relief.130
D. The View of the Lower Courts
In the aftermath of Franchise Tax Board and its progeny, the lower
courts had two artful pleading models from which to choose: the re-
placement preemption model and the complete preemption model.
Although the lower courts often decided the removal question without
explicitly choosing between these models, most of their decisions are con-
sistent with the replacement preemption model. In general, the lower
courts have allowed removal when federal law not only preempts state
claims but also at least arguably supplies replacement federal claims.1 3'
128. See supra text accompanying notes 41-44. This limited view of the Caterpillar foot-
note was adopted in Hawaii v. American Ins. Co., Nos. 91-00153 DAE, 91-00197 DAE, 1991
WL 311868 (D. Haw. July 18, 1991).
129. See Williams v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 786 F.2d 928, 933 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting
that the inquiry is whether "'federal law provides plaintiff a cause of action to remedy the
wrong he asserts he suffered"' (emphasis added) (quoting Hunter v. United Van Lines, 746
F.2d 635, 643 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 863 (1985))), afid, 482 U.S. 386 (1987).
130. See supra text accompanying notes 41-44.
131. See In re Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 964 F.2d 706, 709-10 (7th Cir. 1992);
Bartholet v. Reishauer A.G., 953 F.2d 1073, 1075-78 (7th Cir. 1992); Felton v. Unisource
Corp., 940 F.2d 503, 506-08 (9th Cir. 1991); Carland v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 935 F.2d
1114, 1118-19 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 670 (1991); Brown v. Connecticut Gen. Life
Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 1193, 1195-96 (11th Cir. 1991); McCormick v. AT&T Technologies, Inc.,
934 F.2d 531, 534-37 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 912 (1992); DeSantiago v. Labor-
ers Int'l Union Local No. 1140, 914 F.2d 125, 127-29 (8th Cir. 1990); Nishimoto v. Federman-
Bachrach & Assocs., 903 F.2d 709, 713-15 (9th Cir. 1990); Pruitt v. Carpenters' Local Union
No. 225, 893 F.2d 1216, 1218-19 (1lth Cir. 1990); Kidd v. Southwest Airlines Co., 891 F.2d
540, 545-47 (5th Cir. 1990); Sluder v. United Mine Workers Int'l Union, 892 F.2d 549, 553-56
(7th Cir. 1989), cerL denied, 111 S. Ct. 45 (1990); Fitzgerald v. Codex Corp., 882 F.2d 586,
588 (Ist Cir. 1989); Jackson v. Southern California Gas Co., 881 F.2d 638, 641-42 (9th Cir.
1989); Richardson v. United Steelworkers, 864 F.2d 1162, 1167-70 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 803 (1989); Sorosky v. Burroughs Corp., 826 F.2d 794, 798-801 (9th Cir. 1987); Nor-
dlicht v. New York Tel. Co., 799 F.2d 859, 861-62 (2d Cir. 1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1055
(1987); Harper v. San Diego Transit Corp., 764 F.2d 663, 666-69 (9th Cir. 1985); Vantine v.
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They generally have refused to exercise jurisdiction over cases in which
federal preemption takes a purely defensive posture.132
Elkhart Brass Mfg. Co., 762 F.2d 511, 516-19 (7th Cir. 1985); Oglesby v. RCA Corp., 752
F.2d 272, 275-78 (7th Cir. 1985); Eitmann v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., 730 F.2d 359, 364-67
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984); Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Sheet Metal Workers
Int'l Ass'n Local 159, 714 F.2d 342, 345-46 (4th Cir. 1983); Roe v. General Am. Life Ins. Co.,
712 F.2d 450, 452 (10th Cir. 1983); Holt v. Tonawanda Coke Corp., No. 91-CV-17S, 1992 WL
109096, at *2-*3 (W.D.N.Y. May 6, 1992); Great Coastal Express, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, 782 F. Supp. 302, 304-05 (E.D. Va. 1992); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Operating Eng'rs Local
324 Health Care Plan, 742 F. Supp. 952, 953-56 (E.D. Mich. 1990); Sokolowski v. Allied-
Signal, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 163, 164 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Charter Medical Corp. v. Friese, 732 F.
Supp. 1160, 1163 (N.D. Ga. 1989); Gemcraft Homes, Inc. v. Sumurdy, 688 F. Supp. 289, 291-
95 (E.D. Tex. 1988); Cunningham v. Dixon, 700 F. Supp. 20, 20-21 (S.D. Ohio 1987); Citizens
Alliance to Save the Southline v. Montana Rail Link, 672 F. Supp. 1576, 1578-79 (D. Mont.
1987); Angela Cummings, Inc. v. Purolator Courier Corp., 670 F. Supp. 92, 93-94 (S.D.N.Y.
1987); Cahall v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 644 F. Supp. 806, 809-11 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Seamon
v. Bell Tel. Co., 571 F. Supp. 1073, 1074-75 (W.D. Pa. 1983); Tolson v. Retirement Comm. of
Briggs & Stratton Retirement Plan, 566 F. Supp. 1503, 1504 (E.D. Wis. 1983).
132. See Hurt v. Dow Chem. Co., 963 F.2d 1143, 1144-45 (8th Cir. 1992); Oklahoma ex
rel. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Wyandotte Tribe, 919 F.2d 1449, 1450-51 (10th Cir. 1990), cert
denied, 111 S. Ct. 2829 (1991); Smolarek v. Chrysler Corp., 879 F.2d 1326, 1329-35 (6th Cir.)
(en bane), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 992 (1989); Allstate Ins. Co. v. 65 Sec. Plan, 879 F.2d 90, 92-
94 (3d Cir. 1989); Ethridge v. Harbor House Restaurant, 861 F.2d 1389, 1393-1405 (9th Cir.
1988); Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R., 858 F.2d 936, 938-43 (3d
Cir. 1988); Willy v. Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d 1160, 1164-67 (5th Cir. 1988); Chuska Energy Co.
v. Mobil Exploration & Producing N. Am., 854 F.2d 727, 729-32 (5th Cir. 1988); Beers v.
North Am. Van Lines, 836 F.2d 910, 912-13 (5th Cir. 1988); United Ass'n of Journeymen &
Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus., Local No. 57 v. Bechtel Power Corp., 834
F.2d 884, 886-90 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988); Utley v. Varian Assocs.,
811 F.2d 1279, 1286-88 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 824 (1987); Evans v. Missouri Pac.
R.R., 795 F.2d 57, 58-59 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1013 (1987); Hernandez-
Agosto v. Romero-Barcelo, 748 F.2d 1, 2-4 (1st Cir. 1984); Powers v. South Cent. United
Food & Commercial Workers Unions & Employees Health & Welfare Trust, 719 F.2d 760,
763-66 (5th Cir. 1983); Levy v. Medical Servs. Ass'n, C.A. No. 91-6028, 1992 U.S. LEXIS
11316, at *2-*14 (E.D. Pa. July 27, 1992); Longoria v. Cearley, No. Civ.A.91-CA-955, 1991
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9298, at *2-*8 (W.D. Tex. June 18, 1992); Wisconsin v. Missionaries to the
Preborn, No. 92-C-614, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9096 at *3-*9 (E.D. Wis. June 15, 1992);
Robinson v. Eichler, 795 F. Supp. 1253, 1259-60 (D. Conn. 1992); Allergy Diagnostics Lab. v.
Equitable, 785 F. Supp. 523, 525-27 (W.D. Pa. 1991); Hawaii v. American Ins. Co., Nos. 91-
00153 DAE, 91-00197 DAE, 1991 WL 311868, at *2-*6 (D. Haw. July 18, 1991); Barcelona v.
Sea Victory Maritime, Civ. A. No. 91-2064, 1991 WL 323803, at *1-*4 (E.D. La. July 16,
1991); Boyle v. MTV Networks, Inc., 766 F. Supp. 809, 812-16 (N.D. Cal. 1991); Vail v. Pan
Am Corp., 752 F. Supp. 648, 654-59 (D.N.J. 1990); Ford v. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc., 750 F.
Supp. 766, 772-73 (E.D. La. 1990); Roy v. Ford Motor Co., 748 F. Supp. 492, 494-97 (E.D.
Mich. 1990); Romero v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 739 F. Supp. 1472, 1474-79
(D.N.M. 1990); Kansas ex rel. Stephan v. Trans World Airlines, 730 F. Supp. 366, 367-69 (D.
Kan. 1990); McDonough v. Blue Cross, 131 F.R.D. 467, 469-72 (W.D. Pa. 1990); Interna-
tional Ass'n of Machinists, Local Lodge No. 967 v. General Elec. Co., 713 F. Supp. 547, 555-
58 (N.D.N.Y. 1989); Glass Molders Int'l Union v. Wickes Co., 707 F. Supp. 174, 177-78
(D.N.J. 1989); Wolst v. American Airlines, 668 F. Supp. 1117, 1119-20 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Sharp
v. AT&T Communications, 660 F. Supp. 650, 651-52 (N.D. W. Va. 1987); Departmento de
Asuntos del Consumidor v. Oriental Fed. Say., 648 F. Supp. 1194, 1196 (D.P.R. 1986); Walker
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The Courts of Appeals have divided on their application of the
artful pleading doctrine in the aftermath of Franchise Tax Board
and its progeny. The Second, 133 Third,134 Fifth, 135 Sixth,136 Ninth,137
v. Ideco, 646 F. Supp. 940, 942-43 (E.D. Tex. 1986); Austin v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co.,
644 F. Supp. 763, 765-69 (D. Mass. 1986); Town of Norwood v. Adams-Russell Co., 627 F.
Supp. 742, 743-44 (D. Mass. 1986); Cuomo v. Long Island Lighting Co., 589 F. Supp. 1387,
1391-97 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Schaeffer v. General Motors Corp., 586 F. Supp. 870, 871-73 (E.D.
Mich. 1984); La Freniere v. General Elec. Co., 572 F. Supp. 857, 859-62 (N.D.N.Y. 1983);
Martin v. Wilkes-Barre Publishing Co., 567 F. Supp. 304, 309-10 (M.D. Pa. 1983).
133. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Sarkisian, 794 F.2d 754, 758 (2d Cir.) (noting that the
artful pleading doctrine does not apply when "a defendant argues not only that federal law
preempts the state law on which a plaintiff relies but also that federal law provides no relief on
the facts the plaintiff has alleged"), cert denied, 479 U.S. 885 (1986).
134. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. 65 See. Plan, 879 F.2d 90, 93 (3d Cir. 1989) (noting that the
artful pleading doctrine applies "when the enforcement provisions of a federal statute create a
federal cause of action vindicating the same interest that the plaintiff's cause of action seeks to
vindicate"); Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R., 858 F.2d 936, 942 (3d
Cir. 1988) (noting that "[i]f the federal statute creates no federal cause of action vindicating the
same interest the plaintiff's state cause of action seeks to vindicate, recharacterization as a
federal claim is not possible").
135. See Aaron v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 876 F.2d 1157, 1165 (5th Cir. 1989)
(noting that federal preemption does not provide a ground for removal unless "the statute at
issue... contains a specific jurisdictional grant... to enforce the [preempted] cause of ac-
tion"), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1074 (1990); Willy v. Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d 1160, 1165 (5th
Cir. 1988) (noting that removal under the artful pleading doctrine is improper "unless there
[is] a federal cause of action under the preempting federal law"); see also Aquafaith Shipping,
Ltd. v. Jarillas, 963 F.2d 806, 809 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that pursuant to the artful pleading
doctrine "[t]he court may reconstruct the plaintiff's legal theories, but the court looks only to
the pleadings of the plaintiff" to determine jurisdiction). As discussed below, the Fifth Cir-
cuit's decision in Trans World Airlines v. Mattox, 897 F.2d 773 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 307 (1990), is inconsistent with the replacement preemption model. See infra text accom-
panying notes 158-165. Mattox, however, which did not cite or attempt to distinguish Aaron
or Willy, is probably an erroneous decision.
136. In Cromwell v. Equicor-Equitable HCA Corp., 944 F.2d 1272 (6th Cir. 1991), cert.
dismissed, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 4763 (1992), the Sixth Circuit premised removal jurisdiction on
ERISA preemption. Although the court ultimately found that the plaintiff lacked standing to
assert an ERISA claim, the court emphasized that such standing was fairly arguable at the
time the complaint was filed and that the existence of a fairly arguable federal claim was
necessary to support jurisdiction under the artful pleading doctrine. Id. at 1277-78.
137. See Ultramar America, Ltd. v. Dwelle, 900 F.2d 1412, 1415-16 (9th Cir. 1990);
Ethridge v. Harbor House Restaurant, 861 F.2d 1389, 1395 (9th Cir. 1988); Hyles v. Mensing,
849 F.2d 1213, 1215 (9th Cir. 1988); Young v. Anthony's Fish Grottos, Inc., 830 F.2d 993,
997 (9th Cir. 1987). In Newberry v. Pacific Racing Ass'n, 854 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1988), and
Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. 1989), the Ninth Circuit al-
lowed removal of complaints that did not appear to state claims under federal law. Although
the language of the opinions suggests that the complete preemption model was utilized, the
opinions say only that removal may be proper even though federal law does not provide the
relief requested by the plaintiffs. See Newberry, 854 F.2d at 1146; Chmiel, 873 F.2d at 1287. It
is unclear whether there was a fair argument at the time the complaints were fied that federal
law provided the plaintiffs with a claim. Therefore, Newberry and Chmiel seemingly failed to
undercut the replacement preemption cases. Recent district court cases from the Ninth Cir-
cuit have continued to follow this model. See Hawaii v. American Ins. Co., Nos. 91-00153
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Tenth, 138 and Eleventh 139 Circuits have favored the replacement preemp-
tion model. The First, 140 Seventh, 141 and Eighth 142 Circuits have favored
the complete preemption model.
DAE, 91-00197 DAE, 1991 WL 311868, at *2-*6 (D. Haw. July 18, 1991); Boyle v. MTV
Networks, Inc., 766 F. Supp. 809, 815 (N.D. Cal. 1991); California v. Trans World Airlines,
726 F. Supp. 785, 786 (S.D. Cal. 1989).
138. In Carland v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 935 F.2d 1114 (10th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 112 S. Ct. 670 (1991), the Tenth Circuit held that ERISA preemption justifies removal
only when the plaintiff's claims can be asserted under ERISA's civil enforcement provisions.
Id. at 1118-19. The court ultimately affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff on the merits of a
federal claim. Id. at 1120-22.
139. In Hudson Insurance Co. v. American Elec. Corp., 957 F.2d 826 (1 lth Cir. 1992), an
insurance company filed a federal action seeking a declaration that its policy did not cover
pollution liability imposed by the Environmental Protection Agency. The declaratory judg-
ment action arose under federal law only if an action to enforce the insurance contract would
have arisen under federal law. See id. at 828. The underlying coercive action (the defendant's
action on the insurance contract) would have involved a state contract claim that was arguably
preempted by federal law. The Eleventh Circuit held that, since preemption was involved only
as a defense, the underlying coercive action would not have arisen under federal law. Id. at
829-30. The Eleventh Circuit noted that federal preemption creates federal jurisdiction only
when there is a "parallel federal cause of action that the state court litigant could have
brought." Id. at 830. Although the Eleventh Circuit's opinion involved only the scope of
original jurisdiction, it is directly relevant to the scope of the artful pleading doctrine because
original and removal jurisdiction are coextensive. Because the insured could not have brought
a coercive action against the insurance company in federal court, the insurance company could
not have removed such an action to federal court.
140. In McCoy v. Massachusetts Inst. of Technology, 950 F.2d 13 (lst Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1939 (1992), the First Circuit allowed removal of a state claim to enforce a
mechanic's lien, id. at 15 n. 1, and held that ERISA did not permit state law to grant preferen-
tial treatment to an ERISA benefit plan under a mechanic's lien statute, id. at 18-20.
Although the court did not discuss the theoretical basis of the artful pleading doctrine, it
appears to have applied the complete preemption model.
141. See Leu v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 820 F.2d 825, 827-31 (7th Cir. 1987); Graf v. Elgin, J.
& E. Ry., 790 F.2d 1341, 1344-46 (7th Cir. 1986). The status of the artful pleading doctrine in
the Seventh Circuit is not entirely clear. Although Leu and Graf appeared to adopt the com-
plete preemption model, these cases involved preemption of state law by federal claims that, to
the extent they existed, were within the primary jurisdiction of the National Railroad Adjust-
ment Board. Therefore, these cases are arguably consistent with the replacement preemption
model. See infra text accompanying notes 153-157. Moreover, in Bartholet v. Reishauer
A.G., 953 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1992), the Seventh Circuit noted, in the context of artful plead-
ing removal, that "[p]reemption is what wipes out state law, but the foundation for removal is
the creation of federal law to replace state law." Id. at 1075. This language describes the
replacement preemption model.
142. See DeFord v. Soo Line R.R., 867 F.2d 1080, 1084-86 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 492
U.S. 927 (1989). Deford, like the Seventh Circuit cases applying the complete preemption
model, see supra note 141, involved removal based upon preemption by federal claims that
were within the primary jurisdiction of a federal agency. It is also arguably consistent with the
replacement preemption model. Moreover, in Hurt v. Dow Chemical Co., 963 F.2d 1142 (8th
Cir. 1992), the Eighth Circuit refused to assert removal jurisdiction because the federal statute
that possibly preempted the plaintiff's state tort claim did not provide the plaintiff with a
federal claim. Id. at 1144-45.
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A number of lower court decisions have allowed removal under the
artful pleading doctrine and then denied the plaintiff relief under federal
law. Most of these cases can be explained in ways that are consistent
with the replacement preemption model.
One category of cases involved dismissals of removed claims because
state claims were preempted and the plaintiffs had not pled any federal
claims. 143 In these cases, federal law provided potential replacements for
the preempted state claims. Therefore, the plaintiffs should have been
allowed to seek relief under federal law regardless of their failure to plead
federal claims.144
The federal courts in these cases unnecessarily added insult to in-
jury. Having recharacterized the plaintiffs' state claims as federal claims
for removal purposes, the courts were then unwilling to allow the plain-
tiffs to seek relief under federal law. These cases are unfaithful to the
basic artful pleading notion that the plaintiffs' claims were intrinsically
federal, however pled. They also contradict Rule 8(a)(2), 145 which does
not require the plaintiff to plead the legal theories under which he seeks
relief. Unless the plaintiffs were unable to prove any set of facts that
would entitle them to federal relief, their complaints should not have
been dismissed. 146
A second category of cases allowed removal based on federal pre-
emption and then held on the merits that federal law did not provide the
plaintiff with any claims. 147 These cases are not necessarily inconsistent
.143. See Van Camp v. AT&T Info. Sys., 963 F.2d 119, 121, 124 (6th Cir. 1992); Tingey v.
Pixley-Richards W., Inc., 953 F.2d 1124, 1130-33 (9th Cir. 1992); Welch v. General Motors
Corp. Buick Motor Div., 922 F.2d 287, 294 (6th Cir. 1990) (per curiam); Ramirez v. Inter-
Continental Hotels, 890 F.2d 760, 762-64 (5th Cir. 1989); Hyles v. Mensing, 849 F.2d 1213,
1215 (9th Cir. 1988); Meyer v. Employers Health Ins. Co., 722 F. Supp. 547, 553 (E.D. Wis.
1989); see also Stikes v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 914 F.2d 1265, 1270 (9th Cir. 1990) (dismissing
state claim preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act without consid-
ering whether federal law provided a remedy), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 2015 (1991); Brown v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 901 F.2d 1250, 1255-56 (5th Cir. 1990) (same).
144. See Shannon v. Shannon, 965 F.2d 542, 552-53 (7th Cir. 1992); Bartholet v.
Reishauer A.G., 953 F.2d 1073, 1077-78 (7th Cir. 1992); Ulrich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 884 F.2d 936, 938 (6th Cir. 1989); Fitzgerald v. Codex Corp., 882 F.2d 586, 588-89 (1st
Cir. 1989); Ghebreselassie v. Coleman Sec. Serv., 829 F.2d 892, 895-96 (9th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 487 U.S. 1234 (1988). Indeed, the courts dismissing complaints for failure to plead
federal law usually specified that dismissal was without prejudice and allowed the plaintiff to
amend his complaint in order to specify the potential federal grounds for relief. See Tingey,
953 F.2d at 1133; Ramirez, 890 F.2d at 764; Meyer, 722 F. Supp. at 553; see also Hyles, 849
F.2d at 1215 (granting summary judgment for the defendant and noting that the plaintiff de-
clined the court's invitation to assert a federal claim after removal).
145. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
146. See supra note 65.
147. See Smith v. Dunham-Bush, Inc., 959 F.2d 6, 10-12 (2d Cir. 1992); McCoy v. Massa-
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with the replacement preemption model inasmuch as federal question ju-
risdiction attaches when the plaintiff's replacement federal claim is fairly
arguable and does not require that a federal claim ultimately be held to
exist. 148
A third category of cases involved claims that, once federalized,
were clearly barred by a federal defense at the time of removal. This
category includes cases dismissing: claims barred by a federal statute of
limitations; 149 otherwise valid federal labor claims barred for failure to
comply with grievance procedures contained in collective bargaining
chusetts Inst. of Technology, 950 F.2d 13, 18-23 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1939
(1992); Cromwell v. Equicor-Equitable HCA Corp., 944 F.2d 1272, 1277-78 (6th Cir. 1991),
cert. dismissed, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 4763 (1992); Lister v. Stark, 890 F.2d 941, 944-46 (7th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 579 (1990); Boren v. N.L. Indus., 889 F.2d 1463, 1465-66 (5th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3283 (1990); Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873
F.2d 1283, 1285-87 (9th Cir. 1989); Degan v. Ford Motor Co., 869 F.2d 889, 895 (5th Cir.
1989) (federal question jurisdiction an alternative ground for removal); Newberry v. Pacific
Racing Ass'n, 854 F.2d 1142, 1152 (9th Cir. 1988); Albert Einstein Medical Ctr. v. National
Benefit Fund for Hosp. & Health Care Employees, 740 F. Supp. 343, 348-52 (E.D. Pa. 1989);
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Association of Flight Attendants, 663 F. Supp. 847, 854
(D.D.C. 1987); Northwest Indus. Credit Union v. Salisbury, 634 F. Supp. 191, 195 (W.D.
Mich. 1986).
148. In Smith, Lister, and Degan, claims for ERISA pension benefits based on oral
promises were dismissed by the courts on the ground that ERISA required a writing. See
Smith, 959 F.2d at 10; Lister, 890 F.2d at 944-46; Degan, 869 F.2d at 895. The Seventh
Circuit's discussion in Lister suggests that, although the court dismissed the case, the potential
federal claim under ERISA was fairly arguable. See Lister, 890 F.2d at 944-46. In Cromwell,
although the plaintiff ultimately lacked standing to assert a federal claim, the court empha-
sized that the existence of a fairly arguable federal claim was necessary to support removal
jurisdiction. Cromwell, 944 F.2d at 1277-78. Einstein was explicitly decided under the re-
placement preemption model and it appears that the plaintiff's claim, although dismissed, ar-
guably stated a federal claim. See Einstein, 740 F. Supp. at 348-49. The court granted leave to
replead, but it was arguable that the complaint as originally pled encompassed the allegations
the court believed had to be added to state a federal claim. See id. at 351-52. In Salisbury, the
court's discussion suggests that the preempted state claims stated arguably viable federal
claims. See Salisbury, 634 F. Supp. at 193-95. By contrast, in McCoy, Boren, Chmiel, New-
berry, and Teamsters, there did not seem to have been much of an argument that a replacement
federal claim existed.
149. See Adkins v. General Motors Corp., 946 F.2d 1201, 1203, 1213 (6th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1936 (1992); McCormick v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 934 F.2d 531, 538
(4th Cir. 1991); M. Nahas & Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 930 F.2d 608, 610-11 (8th Cir. 1991);
DeSantiago v. Laborers Int'l Union Local No. 1140, 914 F.2d 125, 130 (8th Cir. 1990); Harris
v. Alumax Mill Prods., 897 F.2d 400, 403-04 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, I 11 S. Ct. 102 (1990);
Degan, 869 F.2d at 892-93; Richardson v. United Steelworkers, 864 F.2d 1162, 1170 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 803 (1989); Paige v. Henry J. Kaiser Co., 826 F.2d 857, 862 (9th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1054 (1988); Harper v. San Diego Transit Corp., 764 F.2d 663,
669 (9th Cir. 1985); Carrington v. RCA Global Communications, Inc., 762 F. Supp. 632, 637-
39 (D.N.J. 1991); Fisher v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 228, 230-33 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
[Vol. 44
agreements1 50 or ERISA plans; 151 and claims barred by other federal de-
fenses.152 These cases are consistent with the replacement preemption
model. Federal question jurisdiction attaches if the plaintiff has an ar-
guably valid federal claim. Federal defenses do not prevent the removal
of a case to federal court even if it is clear at the time of removal that
these defenses will be successful.
In a fourth category of cases, known as forum preemption cases,
federal courts allowed the removal of state claims that were preempted
by federal claims falling within the primary jurisdiction of federal agen-
cies. 153 As a consequence, the complaints had to be dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction after removal.154 The better approach in these
150. See Margerer v. John Sexton & Co., 912 F.2d 525, 531 (1st Cir. 1990); Jackson v.
Southern Cal. Gas Co., 881 F.2d 638, 646 (9th Cir. 1989); Douglas v. American Info. Technol-
ogies Corp., 877 F.2d 565, 574 (7th Cir. 1989); Laws v. Calmat, 852 F.2d 430, 434 (9th Cir.
1988); Sams v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 835 F.2d 848, 850 (11th Cir.
1988) (per curiam); Darden v. U.S. Steel Corp., 830 F.2d 1116, 1120 (1lth Cir. 1987); Young
v. Anthony's Fish Grottos, Inc., 830 F.2d 993, 1002 (9th Cir. 1987); Meier v. Hamilton Stan-
dard Elec. Sys., 748 F. Supp. 296, 302 (E.D. Pa. 1990); LaBuhn v. Bulkmatic Transp. Co., 644
F. Supp. 942, 948 (N.D. Ill. 1986), afl'd, 865 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1988).
151. See Makar v. Health-Care Corp., 872 F.2d 80, 82-83 (4th Cir. 1989).
152. See King v. Hoover Group, Inc., 958 F.2d 219, 221-23 (8th Cir. 1992) (dismissing
removed claims based on res judicata); Kilmer v. Central Counties Bank, 623 F. Supp. 994,
998-1002 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (allowing removal under ERISA and granting summary judgment
for the defendants because the plaintiffs' ERISA claim had been satisfied by payment).
153. See DeSantiago v. Laborers Int'l Union Local No. 1140, 914 F.2d 125, 129-30 (8th
Cir. 1990); Grote v. Trans World Airlines, 905 F.2d 1307, 1309-11 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 386 (1990); Beard v. Carrollton R.R., 893 F.2d 117, 121-23 (6th Cir. 1989); Rayner v.
Smirl, 873 F.2d 60, 67 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 876 (1989); Deford v. Soo Line R.R.,
867 F.2d 1080, 1083, 1091 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 927 (1989); Leu v. Norfolk & W.
Ry., 820 F.2d 825, 826, 831-32 (7th Cir. 1987); Gemmell v. Consolidated Rail Corp., No.
CIV.A.2:89-1066, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7107, at *3-*7 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 12, 1991); Under-
wood v. Trans World Airlines, 710 F. Supp. 78, 84-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Muenchow v. Parker
Pen Co., 615 F. Supp. 1405, 1413-16 (W.D. Wis. 1985); Gray v. Chessie Sys., 588 F. Supp.
1334, 1335 (D. Md. 1984); see also Reid v. United States, 715 F.2d 1148, 1153-54 (7th Cir.
1983) (allowing removal of claims that, once federalized, were within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the United States Court of Claims).
154. See Andrews v. Louisville & N.R.R., 406 U.S. 320, 322-23 (1972). In Graf v. Elgin,
J. & E. Ry., 790 F.2d 1341 (7th Cir. 1986), the Seventh Circuit purported to apply the com-
plete preemption model and permitted the removal of a state retaliatory discharge claim on the
ground that it was preempted by the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163, 181-188
(1982). Graf, 790 F.2d at 1344-46. If the complaint had stated a claim under the Railway
Labor Act, the plaintiff would have been required to submit his federal claim to arbitration
before the National Railroad Adjustment Board. Because the Seventh Circuit believed that
federal law did not provide the plaintiff with any claim upon which to seek relief, the court
dismissed the complaint on the merits rather than for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 1344, 1347.
This result seems erroneous. Once the Seventh Circuit determined that the plaintiffs claim
arose under the Railway Labor Act, it should have dismissed the claim for lack of jurisdiction.
It was the National Railroad Adjustment Board's responsibility to determine the plaintiff's
entitlement to relief, if any. On the removal issue, Graf is consistent with the replacement
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cases would be to view preemption as defensive and refuse removal since
the complaints did not state claims upon which the federal courts were
empowered to grant relief.155 Although some of the forum preemption
cases involved an application of the complete preemption model, 156 they
are essentially consistent with the replacement preemption model. In
these cases, federal preemption extinguished the plaintiff's state claims
and replaced them with federal claims, albeit federal claims that were
within the jurisdiction of federal agencies rather than the federal
courts. 1
5 7
In contrast to the above cases, the Fifth Circuit's recent decision in
Trans World Airlines v. Mattox158 can only be explained as an application
of the complete preemption model.159 In Mattox, the Attorney General
of Texas sued Pan American Airlines in state court alleging that Pan
American engaged in deceptive advertising practices. Pan American ar-
gued that any state regulations in this area were preempted by federal
law and removed the case to federal court. 160 The Fifth Circuit held that
state law was in fact preempted' 6' and that removal was proper because
preemption model because it was fairly arguable that the Railway Labor Act provided the
plaintiff with a federal claim. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit had previously remanded the case to
allow the district court to consider this very question. See id. at 1343.
155. See Ethridge v. Harbor House Restaurant, 861 F.2d 1389, 1400 (9th Cir. 1988); Rail-
way Labor Executives Ass'n v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R., 858 F.2d 936, 942-43 (3d Cir. 1988);
Willy v. Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d 1160, 1169 (5th Cir. 1988); United Ass'n of Journeymen &
Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus., Local No. 57 v. Bechtel Power Corp., 834
F.2d 884, 886-87 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988); Evans v. Missouri Pac.
R.R., 795 F.2d 57, 57-58 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1013 (1987); Norton Coal Co.
v. UMW, 387 F. Supp. 50, 52 (W.D. Va. 1974); Beacon Moving & Storage Inc. v. Local 814,
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 362 F. Supp. 442, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). It should, however, be noted
that the Supreme Court once allowed removal of a claim that had to be dismissed on forum
preemption grounds without considering the removal issue. See Andrews, 406 U.S. at 322-23.
156. See Deford, 867 F.2d at 1084-86; Graf, 790 F.2d at 1345.
157. See Rayner, 873 F.2d at 63 (emphasizing that the statute preempting the plaintiff's
state claim provided him with a remedy); Leu, 820 F.2d at 830 (allowing removal of claim that
could only be evaluated under federal standards); Graf, 790 F.2d at 1346 (noting that artful
pleading removal is proper when "the worker is covered by a collective bargaining contract
and therefore has a potential federal remedy, judicial or arbitrable").
158. 897 F.2d 773 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 307 (1990).
159. For two other cases denying removal that appear to apply the complete preemption
model, see Cablevision of Boston Ltd. Partnership v. Flynn, 710 F. Supp. 23, 28 (D. Mass.)
(denying removal of claim arguably preempted by the federal law regardless of whether federal
law provided a replacement claim because "Congress did not intend to 'totally occupy' the
field of cable television services"), aff'dper curiam, 889 F.2d 377 (1st Cir. 1989), and Lockport
Well & Pump, Inc. v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 708 F. Supp. 178, 181 n.3
(N.D. Ill. 1989) (denying removal regardless of whether the complaint stated a claim under
federal law because state claims were not "completely preempted").
160. Mattox, 897 F.2d at 776.
161. Id. at 779-83.
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federal law occupied the field of airline advertising, and thus left no room
for state regulation. 162
Although the Fifth Circuit did not articulate the artful pleading
model it was applying, the court must have applied the complete preemp-
tion model because, regardless of whether Pan American violated federal
law and whether private plaintiffs have the power to enforce the federal
statute that preempted the Texas Attorney General's suit, the Texas At-
torney General did not have standing to enforce federal standards.1 63
Mattox is contrary to Franchise Tax Board, in which a state plaintiff's
lack of standing to enforce ERISA was the key factor in denying removal
jurisdiction. 164 Mattox is also contrary to recent Fifth Circuit cases
adopting the replacement preemption model. 165 As a consequence, this
case is best seen as wrongly decided.
E. Conclusion
In the last decade, a number of Supreme Court and lower court
cases have potentially expanded the artful pleading doctrine. These cases
have propounded the complete preemption model as an alternative to the
replacement preemption model. When analyzed closely, most of the
complete preemption cases are compatible with the replacement preemp-
tion model. Because Avco is itself an unjustified departure from estab-
lished law, the best approach is to give the artful pleading doctrine its
narrowest possible application pursuant to the replacement preemption
model.
IV. The Dual Filing Branch of the Artful Pleading Doctrine
A. Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie
Prior to 1981, the artful pleading doctrine was generally limited to
cases in which federal law preempted the state claims upon which a
162. Id. at 787-88.
163. See California v. Trans World Airlines, 720 F. Supp. 826, 828 (S.D. Cal. 1989).
164. See supra text accompanying notes 79-81, 100-102; Allergy Diagnostics Lab. v. Equi-
table, 785 F. Supp. 523, 527 (W.D. Pa. 1991). But see Texas v. National Council of Allied
Employees, No. CIV.A.92-CA-205, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6238 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 1992)
(suggesting that if state claims are preempted by ERISA, they may be removed and dismissed
for lack of ERISA standing). Similar cases involving attempts by state officials to enforce
deceptive advertising standards against airlines have been remanded to state courts. See Kan-
sas ex rel Stephan v. Trans World Airlines, 730 F. Supp. 366, 368 (D. Kan. 1990) (remanding
because Congress did not intend to allow removal); New York v. Trans World Airlines, 728 F.
Supp. 162, 175-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (remanding because federal law did not preempt state law);
California v. Trans World Airlines, 726 F. Supp. 785, 786 (S.D. Cal. 1989) (applying the
replacement preemption model).
165. See supra note 135.
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plaintiff purported to rely. In Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moi-
tie, 16 6 the Court created a new branch of the artful pleading doctrine that
was not dependent on federal preemption of state law.
In Federated Department Stores, Brown, one of seven plaintiffs,
brought a federal action alleging retail price-fixing in the women's cloth-
ing industry in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act 167
(Brown 1). Five other plaintiffs brought similar federal actions. The sev-
enth plaintiff, Moitie, brought a state action based on the same conduct
(Moitie 1). All seven plaintiffs purported to represent a class of purchas-
ers of women's garments. Moitie's case was removed to federal court,
and the seven cases were consolidated. 168 The district court dismissed
the complaints. The court ruled that the plaintiffs, as purchasers, had
not alleged a sufficient injury to their business or property to confer
standing under the federal antitrust laws. Five plaintiffs appealed the
dismissal. Brown and Moitie did not appeal. 169
Brown and Moitie subsequently filed state court actions based on
the same conduct as their original suits and asserted state claims for
fraud, unfair business practices, civil conspiracy, and restitution under
California law (Brown 11 and Moitie 11). 170 Both cases were removed to
federal court. The district court held that removal was proper and that
the claims asserted by Brown and Moitie were barred by res judicata. 17'
Brown and Moitie appealed the res judicata dismissals to the Ninth
Circuit.172 While these appeals were pending, the Supreme Court de-
cided Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., holding that retail purchasers had stand-
ing to enforce the federal antitrust laws. 173 As a consequence, the five
companion cases that had been brought with Brown I and Moitie I were
reversed by the Ninth Circuit and remanded for trial.174 In Brown H and
Moitie 11, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court had subject mat-
ter jurisdiction over the removed complaints and that the reversal of the
companion cases deprived Brown I and Moitie I of res judicata effect. ' 75
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's res judicata holding and
remanded Brown I1 and Moitie HI for trial. 76
166. 452 U.S. 394 (1981).
167. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
168. Federated Dep't Stores, 452 U.S. at 395-96.
169. Id. at 396.
170. Id. at 404-05 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 396-97.
172. Id. at 397.
173. 442 U.S. 330 (1979).
174. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 397 (1981).
175. Id. at 397-98 & n.2.
176. See id. at 397-98.
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Brown II and Moitie 11.177
The appeal in Moitie 11 was voluntarily dismissed prior to the Court's
decision. 178 The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit decision in Brown 11
and held that Brown I was preclusive despite the reversals in the compan-
ion cases. Most of the Court's opinion is devoted to this issue. 179 In a
cryptic footnote, however, the Court affirmed the lower courts' view that
"at least some of the claims had a sufficient federal character to support
removal."180 The Court accepted the "factual finding" of the lower
courts that the plaintiff in Brown HI "had attempted to avoid removal
jurisdiction by 'artful[ly]' casting [his] 'essentially federal law claims' as
state-law claims."""
The Court did not explain which of the claims in Brown 11 were
federal182 or why they "had a sufficient federal character to support re-
moval,"18 3 and it is difficult to understand the grounds on which the
Court based its jurisdictional holding. Even if Brown's claims in his sec-
ond lawsuit were construed as state antitrust claims, state antitrust law
177. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 449 U.S. 991 (1980).
178. Federated Dep't Stores, 452 U.S. at 396 n.1.
179. Id. at 398-402.
180. I1, at 397 n.2.
181. Id. (quoting the district court's opinion).
182. On remand, the Ninth Circuit ruled that all the claims in Brown II were federal in
nature. See Brown v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 653 F.2d 1266, 1267 (9th Cir. 1981). The
Second Circuit subsequently took the view that only Brown's civil conspiracy claim was fed-
eral in nature. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Sarkisian, 794 F.2d 754, 760 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 885 (1986).
183. The Court also did not explain in what manner the artful pleading doctrine involves
fact-finding by the district court. Prior to Federated Department Stores, removal based on the
artful pleading doctrine required an analysis of whether a plaintiff's state claims were pre-
empted by federal law and whether such preemption justified removal. These inquiries seem
purely legal in nature. See Federated Dep't Stores, 452 U.S. at 409 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); Travelers, 794 F.2d at 761 n.9. But see Salveson v. Western States Bankcard Ass'n, 731
F.2d 1423, 1429 (9th Cir. 1984) (applying the clearly erroneous standard of review to an artful
pleading determination). Perhaps the Supreme Court meant to refer to a small body of artful
pleading law in which courts found the plaintiff's purpose in attempting to avoid federal juris-
diction relevant and allowed removal only if his purpose could be described as fraudulent. See,
e.g., Hunter v. United Van Lines, 746 F.2d 635, 642-43, 644 n.6 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 863 (1985); Villarreal v. Brown Express, Inc., 529 F.2d 1219, 1221 (5th Cir. 1976);
Twitchell, supra note 46, at 830 n.95. If the plaintiff's motive is relevant to the artful pleading
inquiry, such motive is a factual question for the district court to resolve, and the district
court's finding is entitled to deference on appeal. See FED. R. CIv. P. 52(a). Examining the
true nature of the plaintiff's claims rather than the plaintiffs purpose, however, is the generally
accepted basis of the artful pleading inquiry. See Twitchell, supra note 46, at 836; Levy, supra
note 92, at 661; Rona L. Pietrzak, Note, Federated Department Stores v. Moitie: A Radical
Departure from Traditional Removal Jurisdiction or an Aberration?, 43 U. Prrr. L. Rnv. 1165,
1177 (1982).
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was not thought to be preempted by federal antitrust law in 1981.184 Nor
did federal law provide the only potential basis for relief. 8 5 California
provided remedies for antitrust violations, 18 6 and there is no hint in the
Court's opinion that the state law allegations in Brown II failed to state
claims under California law. Therefore, Federated Department Stores
was not an application of preexisting artful pleading law.18 7
Federated Department Stores also violates well-established jurisdic-
tional principles. Brown should have been entitled to ignore available
federal claims and seek relief exclusively under state law. If not, Feder-
ated Department Stores contradicts the master-of-the-complaint rule.
Although federal law may have been relevant to a res judicata defense, 188
removal is not usually allowed on the basis of a federal defense. If a
federal res judicata defense justified removal, Federated Department
Stores contradicts the well-pleaded complaint rule.
Nor can Federated Department Stores be dismissed on the ground
that the footnote discussing jurisdiction was simply an ill-considered
statement by the Court that was not meant to upset settled law.189 The
jurisdictional statement was necessary to the holding because the Court
could not have reversed the Ninth Circuit on the merits of the res judi-
cata issue without it. Moreover, the Court issued the footnote over a
vigorous dissent by Justice Brennan that identified the seeming flaws in
184. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 130 (1978). The Supreme
Court recently confirmed that federal antitrust law does not preempt state laws on the same
subject. See California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 109 (1989).
185. See supra note 45 (noting that the artful pleading doctrine is potentially applicable
whenever federal law provides the only possible basis for recovery).
186. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16720, 16726 (West 1964).
187. Although Federated Department Stores seems a surprising departure from established
law, the Fifth Circuit anticipated Federated Department Stores, as well as the Ninth Circuit's
interpretation of it. See infra text accompanying notes 210-221. In Villarreal v. Brown Ex-
press, Inc., the court allowed removal on the ground that state claims pled in state court were
merged into a prior federal judgment. 529 F.2d 1219, 1221 (5th Cir. 1976).
188. Federal law governs the res judicata effect of a federal court judgment in a federal
question case on a subsequent lawsuit in state court. See Limbach v. Hooven & Allison Co.,
466 U.S. 353, 361-62 (1984); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 170-71 (1938); Deposit Bank v.
Frankfort, 191 U.S. 499, 514-18 (1903); Sullivan v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc., 813 F.2d 1368,
1376 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Sarkisian, 794 F.2d
754, 761 n.8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 885 (1986); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDG-
MENTS § 87 (1980); 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 4468, at 651-52 (2d ed. 1981).
189. But see Blumenfeld, supra note 64, at 365 (arguing that Federated Department Stores
"should be read solely as a res judicata decision"); Pietrzak, supra note 183, at 1177 (arguing
that after Federated Department Stores removal should continue to be available "in conformity
with traditional removal principles, only if a plaintiff's claim required construction of federal
law").
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the Court's jurisdictional analysis. 190 The only conclusion is that the
Court said what it meant and meant what it said. 191
B. The Lower Courts Apply Federated Department Stores
Because Federated Department Stores did not give a rationale for its
jurisdictional holding, it fell to the lower courts to supply one. The Sec-
ond and Ninth Circuits have taken the lead in attempting to discern the
basis for the Court's jurisdictional ruling. As discussed below, neither
Circuit's view proves to be satisfactory.
(1) The Election of Remedies View
In Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Sarkisian,192 the Second Circuit held
that Federated Department Stores allows removal whenever the plaintiff
files a complaint based on federal law in federal court and subsequently
files state claims with essentially the same elements in state court. 193 The
court viewed Federated Department Stores as a variant, rather than a
contradiction, of the master-of-the-complaint rule. In the Second Cir-
cuit's view, Brown had initially elected to proceed in federal court based
on federal antitrust law. At the initial stage, he was free to characterize
his claims however he wished. Having done so, he was not later free to
recharacterize his claims under state law in an attempt to avoid the res
judicata effect of a federal judgment. 94 The Second Circuit's rule allows
a plaintiff only one bite at the characterization apple.195
190. See Federated Dep't Stores, 452 U.S. at 406-10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
191. It should, however, be noted that just two years after Federated Department Stores,
the Franchise Tax Board Court surveyed the law of federal question jurisdiction and artful
pleading without mentioning Federated Department Stores. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Con-
struction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 7-12, 22-24 (1983); Magic Chef, Inc. v. Interna-
tional Molders Union, 581 F. Supp. 772, 776 n.4 (E.D. Tenn. 1983) (arguing that "Franchise
Tax Board supersedes [Federated Department Stores]").
192. 794 F.2d 754 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 885 (1986).
193. Id. at 760.
194. Id. at 760-61.
195. A number of lower courts adopted the election of remedies view prior to Travelers.
See Powers v. South Cent. United Food & Commercial Workers Unions & Employers Health
& Welfare Trust, 719 F.2d 760, 766 (5th Cir. 1983) (denying removal because the plaintiff
"ha[d] not evidenced a desire to proceed under federal law" by filing a prior federal com-
plaint); Reid v. Walsh, 620 F. Supp. 930, 934 (M.D. La. 1985) (allowing removal of state
claims because the plaintiff fied federal claims on the same day containing "the same general
allegations and factual descriptions"); Salveson v. Western States Bankcard Ass'n, 525 F.
Supp. 566, 577 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (noting that Federated Department Stores allows removal
"only when the plaintiff by his own conduct, either by filing originally in federal court or by
acceding to federal jurisdiction after removal, has made his claim a federal one"), affld in part
and rev'd in part, 731 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1984).
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The Second Circuit's view has certain attractive qualities. Travelers
pays obeisance to the master-of-the-complaint rule, although restricting
it somewhat, and is consistent with the well-pleaded complaint rule. 196
In this regard, it is faithful to the spirit of Avco. At least under the re-
placement preemption model, Avco may also be viewed as an exception to
the master-of-the-complaint rule. 197 Travelers is also consistent with
other cases in which the plaintiff's actions, rather than the allegations of
his complaint, establish his consent, whether real or fictional, to proceed
under federal law. 198
The Second Circuit's analysis also has problematic aspects. The
court's attempt to explain Federated Department Stores on some basis
other than the res judicata impact of the prior federal judgment is not
wholly successful. In Travelers, the Second Circuit held that the com-
plaint was not removable because the claims filed in the second action
did not have substantially the same elements as the prior federal
claims. 199 If the state claims had been sufficiently similar, however, the
court would have had to inquire whether those claims were the same as
the prior federal claims for removal purposes.2°°
Had it been forced to make this inquiry, the Second Circuit presum-
ably would have required that the second-filed state claims have the same
factual basis as the prior federal claims. In a wide variety of contexts,
196. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Sarkisian, 794 F.2d 754, 761 n.8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 885 (1986).
197. See supra text accompanying notes 45-49.
198. See Salveson, 525 F. Supp. at 576-77. It is, of course, well settled that the parties
cannot establish federal jurisdiction by consent and that the right to challenge jurisdiction is
never waived. See American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17-18 (1951); Capron v.
Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 126, 127 (1804). However, a number of courts have allowed
removal of claims that were ambiguous as to whether state or federal law governed relief when
the plaintiff did not object to removal in a timely fashion. See Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv.
v. McCarthy, 708 F.2d 1, 3-6 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 936 (1983); Vitarroz Corp. v.
Borden, Inc., 644 F.2d 960, 963-65 (2d Cir. 1981); Stone v. Stone, 632 F.2d 740, 742-43 (9th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981); In re Carter, 618 F.2d 1093, 1100-03 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 949 (1981). Although the plaintiff is the master of his claim, he
may be deemed to assert his potential federal claim when he does not object to removal.
Although the plaintiff may not consent to jurisdiction, he may consent to have his claims
viewed as federal. See Vitarroz Corp., 644 F.2d at 964. Similarly, if the plaintiff does not
object to removal, the case proceeds to judgment on the merits in the trial court, and the
plaintiff attacks subject matter jurisdiction on appeal, the issue on appeal is whether the dis-
trict court would have had original jurisdiction, not whether the district court properly exer-
cised removal jurisdiction. See Grubbs v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 405 U.S. 699, 702
(1972).
199. Travelers, 794 F.2d at 761.
200. See Reid v. Walsh, 620 F. Supp. 930, 934 (M.D. La. 1985) (allowing removal of state
claims that contained "the same general allegations and factual descriptions" contained in
federal claims filed on the same day).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44
whether claims have a sufficiently similar factual basis to be treated to-
gether is determined by whether they arise out of the same transaction or
occurrence.201 Presumably the Second Circuit would have applied the
same transaction test to determine whether the second-fied state claims
involved a reassertion of the prior federal claims. This inquiry is identi-
cal to the res judicata inquiry because the same transaction test is also
used to determine the scope of a claim for preclusion purposes.20 2
When the first-filed federal action has proceeded to judgment, as in
Travelers, the Second Circuit's rule avoids the res judicata inquiry in
cases in which the second-fied state claims do not have substantially the
same elements as the prior federal claims.20 3 Under the Second Circuit's
rule, similarity of elements is a necessary but not sufficient condition for
removal. Thus, taking the Second Circuit's view, removal in Federated
Department Stores is premised not only on the fact that the second-fied
state claims had substantially similar elements as the prior federal claims,
but also on the fact that they arose out of the same transaction.2°4
The Second Circuit's test is also problematic because it is difficult to
apply. The test turns on whether the claims in a second state lawsuit are
201. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) (stating that counterclaims are compulsory if they "arise]
out of the [same] transaction or occurrence" as the plaintiff's claim); FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2)
(stating that amendments relate back to an original pleading whenever the amended pleading
"arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in
the original pleading"); FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a) (permitting joinder of claims against different
parties if they arise "out of the same transaction, occurrence, series of transactions or occur-
rences"); Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 371 n.10 (1978) (assuming that
ancillary jurisdiction attaches to claims that arise out of a "common nucleus of operative
fact"); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (holding that pendent juris-
diction attaches to claims that "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact").
202. See, eg., Keith v. Aldridge, 900 F.2d 736, 740 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 257
(1990); Lane v. Peterson, 899 F.2d 737, 742-44 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 74 (1990);
Lowell Staats Mining Co. v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 878 F.2d 1271, 1274 (10th Cir. 1989).
203. The Second Circuit's test seemingly allows recharacterization of second-filed state
claims when parallel federal claims have not proceeded to judgment. Res judicata does not
apply to these cases. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 19 (1980). This aspect
of the Second Circuit's test is questionable. See Sullivan v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc., 813 F.2d
1368, 1375 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987). In addition to lacking res judicata
impact, a prior-fied federal case that has not proceeded to judgment normally does not pro-
vide grounds to enjoin a subsequent state in personam action. See, eg., Atlantic Coast Line
R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 295-96 (1970); Carter v. Ogden
Corp., 524 F.2d 74, 76 (5th Cir. 1975). Thus, the federal case usually must proceed to judg-
ment first in order to have an impact on the state case. If the federal interest in protecting a
first-in-time federal case is not sufficient to justify federal intervention in state proceedings, and
if the state court is free to decide its case without regard to the pendency of federal proceed-
ings, it is hard to understand why there is a sufficient federal interest in preventing dual litiga-
tion to justify recharacterizing the claims in the state lawsuit as federal claims.
204. See Federated Dep't Stores, 452 U.S. at 396 (noting that the second-fied state claims
were based on the same allegations as the prior federal action).
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"substantially" similar to the claims in a prior federal lawsuit. Because
substantiality is always in the eye of the beholder, this test is inherently
unpredictable. 20 5 Although it was easy for the Travelers court to apply
the substantial similarity test in the case before it,2° 6 other cases promise
to be more difficult. Further, the Travelers court did not provide any
guidelines for the application of this test. The court's only explanation
for why the elements of the federal antitrust claim in Brown I and the
state antitrust claim in Brown II were "substantially" the same was that
California antitrust law was generally the same as federal law. 20 7
Finally, the Travelers decision is questionable in that it is somewhat
unfaithful to Federated Department Stores. Admittedly, Federated De-
partment Stores focused only on the disposition of Brown II, and the
Travelers decision did supply a justification for the jurisdictional holding
in Brown II. The lower courts, however, whose holdings the Supreme
Court endorsed, had also accepted jurisdiction over Moitie 11.208 Unlike
Brown, Moitie filed his first complaint in state court based on state law
and had it removed.20 9 Under the Second Circuit's modified master-of-
the-complaint rationale, Moitie II would have been remanded because
Moitie had never elected to proceed in federal court under federal law.
This result is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's whole-hearted ac-
ceptance of the lower courts' jurisdictional rulings.
(2) The Res Judicata View
In Sullivan v. First Affiliated Securities, Inc. ,210 the Ninth Circuit
took a different approach in applying Federated Department Stores. The
Ninth Circuit held that Federated Department Stores permits removal of
state claims that are barred by the res judicata effect of a prior federal
judgment.211 In contrast to the Second Circuit's attempt to be faithful to
205. See Sullivan, 813 F.2d at 1375 (arguing that "attempts to place limits on the scope of
the election rationale have been unsatisfactory").
206. See Travelers, 794 F.2d at 761 (holding that state claims for fraudulent conveyance,
piercing the corporate veil, unlawful payment of dividends, and unlawful salary payments were
not substantially similar to claims asserted under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Orga-
nizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1966 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), because the existence of a
pattern of racketeering activity and the operation of an enterprise were elements of the federal
but not the state claims).
207. See Travelers, 794 F.2d at 760.
208. See Federated Dep't Stores, 452 U.S. at 397 n.2.
209. Id. at 395-96.
210. 813 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1987).
211. Id. at 1375-76. Whether state claims are barred by the res judicata effect of a federal
court's judgment in a prior federal question case is a difficult question. In order to be barred,
state claims have to arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as the prior federal claims,
which is the general federal test for res judicata. See supra text accompanying note 202.
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the notion that the artful pleading doctrine is consistent with the well-
pleaded complaint rule,212 the Ninth Circuit recognized that removal
based on federal preemption always involves removal based on a federal
defense.213 Because the artful pleading doctrine is already inconsistent
with the well-pleaded complaint rule, the Ninth Circuit viewed Federated
Department Stores as an extension of the same principle. 214
The Ninth Circuit's analysis of the nature of preemption under the
artful pleading doctrine is accurate. Even the replacement preemption
model, which comes closest to reconciling the artful pleading doctrine
with traditional jurisdictional law, allows removal based on a federal de-
fense. 215 The Supreme Court has never acknowledged, however, that the
artful pleading doctrine is inconsistent with the well-pleaded complaint
rule.21 6 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit's attempt to create a second excep-
tion to the well-pleaded complaint rule does not seem well founded. To
view the Federated Department Stores Court as requiring otherwise
Claims that a plaintiff did not have the power to bring in the prior suit, however, are not
barred by res judicata. See supra note 57. State claims arising out of the same transaction or
occurrence as federal claims will be within the pendent jurisdiction of the federal court in the
initial case. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). The federal court's
exercise of jurisdiction over these claims is discretionary. See id. at 726-27. As a consequence,
the application of res judicata to pendent state claims depends upon the second court's predic-
tion of whether the first court would have exercised its discretion to hear the pendent state
claims. See RfsATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 25 cmt. e (1980) (suggesting that the
pendent state claims should be barred in a second suit unless the federal court "would clearly
have declined to exercise ... [its] discretion" over them). In Federated Department Stores,
Brown I was dismissed at the threshold for lack of standing. The district court probably would
not have exercised its discretion to hear the pendent state claims. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726.
As a consequence, the majority in Federated Department Stores suggested that only claims
federalized by the artful pleading doctrine were barred by the application of res judicata. See
Federated Dep't Stores, 452 U.S. at 402; see also Mark Jay Altschuler, Note, The Res Judicata
Implications of Pendent Jurisdiction, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 608, 622-24 (1981) (arguing that res
judicata does not apply to potential pendent claims when the federal claims in the first case
were dismissed for failure to state a claim).
212. See Travelers, 794 F.2d at 758, 761 n.8.
213. See Sullivan, 813 F.2d at 1372 n.5.
214. See id, at 1376. A number of other courts have adopted Sullivan. See Hartley v.
Mentor Corp., 869 F.2d 1469, 1471 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (allowing removal based on the collat-
eral estoppel effect of a prior federal judgment); Pointer v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 791 F.
Supp. 164, 167-68 (S.D. Tex. 1992); King Provision Corp. v. Burger King Corp., 750 F. Supp.
501, 505 (M.D. Fla. 1990); Nowling v. Aero Servs. Int'l, 734 F. Supp. 733, 737 (E.D. La.
1990); see also Maierhofer v. Crown Realty Co., No. CIV.A.89-F-330, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18184, at *-*13 (D. Colo. Apr. 11, 1989) (denying removal of state securities claims filed
simultaneously with federal securities claims).
215. See supra text accompanying notes 50-52.
216. The artful pleading doctrine is usually described as a "corollary" of the well-pleaded
complaint rule. See, e.g., Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393; Taylor, 481 U.S. at 63; Franchise Tax
Bd., 463 U.S. at 22.
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means reading a great deal into the Court's cryptic footnote on
jurisdiction.
The Ninth Circuit's analysis of Federated Department Stores is also
objectionable because it requires a federal court to decide the res judicata
defense on the merits to determine whether jurisdiction exists. 2 17 The
Sullivan test leads to anomalous results whether or not the district court
ultimately holds that it has jurisdiction. If the district court decides it
has jurisdiction, the complaint is not only removable but also barred by
res judicata in the same instant.21 8 Sullivan allows removal only if the
federal defense will be successful. 219 If the district court decides it does
not have jurisdiction, its ruling on the merits of the res judicata issue is
not binding on the state court on remand. The defendant will have a
second opportunity to assert his federal res judicata defense, resulting in
a substantial waste of judicial resources. 220
Finally, Sullivan, like Travelers, is somewhat inconsistent with Fed-
erated Department Stores. The Supreme Court in Federated Department
Stores did not connect the removal issue with the res judicata issue. It
held that jurisdiction existed prior to examining the merits of the res
judicata issue.221 Therefore, it would seem that the existence of jurisdic-
tion in Federated Department Stores depended on some other ground.
217. Cf. Travelers, 794 F.2d at 761 n.10 (noting that the scope of a claim for jurisdictional
purposes is not the same for artful pleading purposes as it is for res judicata purposes).
218. See Williams, supra note 51, at 1006.
219. Before deciding the claims were not removable, the Sullivan court thought it neces-
sary to note that the claims in the state lawsuit were not "barred by res judicata." Sullivan,
813 F.2d at 1376. The claims in Sullivan were not barred by res judicata because the prior
federal case had not proceeded to judgment. Id. at 1370. The courts following Sullivan have
required that removal be conditioned on the plaintiff's state claims actually being barred by res
judicata. Compare Redwood Theaters, Inc. v. Festival Enters., 908 F.2d 477, 480-81 (9th Cir.
1990) (refusing to allow removal of state antitrust claims that were not preempted by federal
law in the absence of res judicata) and Her Majesty the Queen v. City of Detroit, 874 F.2d 332,
342 (6th Cir. 1989) (denying removal and noting that Federated Department Stores "applies
only to the removal of state claims barred by a prior federal judgment") and California v.
Chevron Corp., 872 F.2d 1410, 1416 (9th Cir. 1989) (denying removal when the judgments in
first-filed federal actions were reversed on appeal) and Pointer v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 791
F. Supp. 164, 167 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (denying removal when a prior federal case had not pro-
ceeded to judgment) with Nowling v. Aero Servs. Int'l. 734 F. Supp. 733, 737 (E.D. La. 1990)
(allowing removal of a state case that was "no more than an attempt to collaterally attack" a
prior federal case).
220. See infra note 318 and accompanying text.
221. Federated Dep't Stores, 452 U.S. at 397 n.2.
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(3) The Res Judicata View Applied to Diversity Cases
The res judicata view of Federated Department Stores reached its
apogee in Ryan v. Dow Chemical Co.2 22 Prior to Ryan, plaintiffs claiming
that they had been harmed by their exposure to Agent Orange brought
numerous federal class actions based on diversity of citizenship. These
cases were settled in 1984.223 One group of plaintiffs in Ryan, composed
of individuals covered by the Agent Orange settlement, filed state tort
claims in state court that were identical to the claims in the Agent Or-
ange class actions.224 These claims were brought against nondiverse de-
fendants who were also defendants in the Agent Orange litigation.225
The defendants removed the case, relying in part on an artful pleading
theory.226 Judge Weinstein, of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York, interpreted Travelers as holding that re-
moval is proper whenever a plaintiff files claims in a federal lawsuit and
files "virtually identical" claims in a subsequent state lawsuit.227 Since
the tort claims in Ryan were identical to the tort claims asserted in the
Agent Orange litigation, Judge Weinstein held that the federal court had
jurisdiction.228
Ryan is arguably a fair extension of the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Sullivan. If removal can be used to prevent plaintiffs from filing state
court litigation in order to avoid the res judicata impact of a previous
federal judgment, it may be irrelevant whether jurisdiction in the federal
case was based on federal question or diversity jurisdiction.2 29 Yet, the
Ryan court ignored the fact that the federal interest in enforcing a diver-
sity judgment is not as significant as the federal interest in enforcing a
federal question judgment. For example, although it is clear that federal
law governs the res judicata effect of a federal judgment in a federal ques-
tion case,230 whether federal or state law governs the res judicata effect of
a federal diversity judgment is disputed.231 Given the diminished federal
222. 781 F. Supp. 902 (E.D.N.Y.), reh'g granted in part, No. 79 Civ. 747, 1991 WL 24331
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 1991).
223. Id at 908-11.
224. Id. at 911-14.
225. Id
226. See id, at 913.
227. Id at 917 (quoting Travelers, 794 F.2d at 760).
228. Id at 916-18; see also Hornsby v. Hornsby's Stores, Inc., No. 90-C-06105, 1991 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2926, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 1991) (allowing removal based upon the res judi-
cata impact of a prior federal judgment founded on state law).
229. Ryan v. Dow Chemical Co., 781 F. Supp. 902 (E.D.N.Y.), reh'g granted in part, No.
79 Civ. 747, 1991 WL 24331 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 1991).
230. See supra note 188.
231. See Gelb v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 798 F.2d 38,42 n.3 (2d Cir. 1986) (collecting cases
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interest in enforcing federal diversity judgments, it seems inappropriate
to extend Federated Department Stores, a questionable case at best, to the
diversity context. The Ninth Circuit itself has held that Federated De-
partment Stores does not permit removal based on the res judicata impact
of a federal case adjudicating state law issues.232
Ryan, moreover, was decided by a district court in the Second Cir-
cuit that was required to follow Travelers rather than Sullivan. Travelers
rejected the view that the existence of a federal res judicata defense al-
lows removal under the artful pleading doctrine. 233 Travelers was based
on the notion that a federal claim, once asserted, remains federal for all
time.2 34 Diversity, once established, does not exist permanently. By its
very nature, diversity of citizenship is dependent on the parties involved
in a particular case. The plaintiff's artful pleading cannot have any effect
on the existence of diversity.
One can easily understand Judge Weinstein's desire to extend fed-
eral protection to the settlement in the Agent Orange litigation, which
settled claims in over 600 cases involving approximately 15,000 plaintiffs,
took six years to conclude, and will not be finally disposed of until
1994.235 Judge Weinstein did have the right to enjoin the state court
litigation in Ryan, consistent with the Anti-Injunction Act, "in aid of
[his] jurisdiction" in the Agent Orange litigation or "to protect or effec-
tuate [the] judgmentfl" in the Agent Orange litigation.236 It may seem
regarding the res judicata effect of a federal diversity judgment), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 948
(1987); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 87 cmt. b (1982) (taking the view
that federal law should govern the preclusive effect of a federal diversity judgment). Compare
Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal Common
Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 778-97 (1986) (arguing that state law
should govern the preclusive effect of a federal diversity judgment) with Ronan E. Degnan,
Federalized Res Judicata, 85 YALE L.J. 741, 755-73 (1976) (arguing that federal law should
govern the preclusive effect of a federal diversity judgment). If state law governs the res judi-
cata issue, removal is clearly improper in a case between nondiverse parties because there is no
federal question in the case.
232. See Ultramar Am., Ltd. v. Dwelle, 900 F.2d 1412, 1414-17 (9th Cir. 1990).
233. See 794 F.2d at 761 n.8.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 193-195.
235. See Ryan, 781 F. Supp. at 907-08, 914.
236. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1988). The Anti-Injunction Act permits federal judges to enjoin
state court proceedings that would interfere with the disposition of federal class actions, see,
e.g., Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 877 F.2d 877, 880-83 (1 1th Cir. 1989); In re Baldwin-
United Corp., 770 F.2d 328, 337 (2d Cir. 1985), or involve an attempt to relitigate matters
decided by a federal court in a prior proceeding, see, e.g., Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. NL
Indus., 825 F.2d 634, 639 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 992 (1987); Silcox v. United Truck-
ing Serv., 687 F.2d 848, 850-51 (6th Cir. 1982). See generally 17 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note
9, §§ 4225-26 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1992) (discussing Anti-Injunction Act). Judge Weinstein's
decision to entertain jurisdiction in Ryan was on the alternative ground that he had continuing
jurisdiction over the settlement in the Agent Orange litigation. See Ryan, 781 F. Supp. at 915-
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irrelevant whether Judge Weinstein protected the Agent Orange settle-
ment by ensuring that res judicata barred the state claims in Ryan237 or
by enjoining the state litigation.
There is, however, a difference. Allowing removal based on the res
judicata impact of a federal judgment gives the defendant an absolute
right to a federal forum in subsequent litigation. The Anti-Injunction
Act merely allows federal judges to exercise their discretion in enjoining
state court relitigation.238 Protecting the prior federal judgment through
removal, rather than requiring an application for an injunction, elimi-
nates the district judge's discretion to deny an injunction based on gen-
eral equitable principles or respect for the state courts' ability to apply
res judicata correctly.239 Therefore, recourse to the federal courts' equi-
table powers, rather than removal, better protects federal judgments
against state court evasion. 24o
16. It is well accepted that no independent basis of jurisdiction is required to issue an injunc-
tion protecting a prior judgment. See, e.g., Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 239 (1934);
Southwest Airlines Co. v. Texas Int'l Airlines, 546 F.2d 84, 89-90 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 434
U.S. 832 (1977).
237. In Ryan, the application of res judicata to the claims of the unnamed class members
in the Agent Orange litigation depended on whether the Agent Orange class actions com-
ported with constitutional due process requirements, see, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32,
42-43 (1940), and the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. The Second Cir-
cuit's rulings on the appeals from the Agent Orange litigation appear to establish that these
requirements were met. See Ryan, 781 F. Supp. at 909.
238. See Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 151 (1988) (noting that "the fact
that an injunction may issue under the Anti-Injunction Act does not mean that it must issue").
The federal courts have often refused to enjoin subsequent state litigation despite the potential
preclusive impact of a prior federal judgment. See, e.g., Staffer v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 878
F.2d 638, 644 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding no abuse of discretion in a district court's denial of an
injunction); Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp. v. Hartigan, 816 F.2d 1177, 1181-82 (7th Cir. 1987)
(noting that the district court had discretion to refuse to enjoin state court proceedings because
the res judicata defense could be raised in state court); Lamb Enters. v. Kiroff, 549 F.2d 1052,
1060-61 (6th Cir.) (reversing the grant of an injunction because the ability to raise the res
judicata defense in state court constituted an adequate remedy at law), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
968 (1977).
239. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243 (1972) (noting that the fact that a case falls
outside the prohibitory scope of the Anti-Injunction Act does not "qualify in any way the
principles of equity, comity, and federalism that must restrain a federal court when asked to
enjoin a state court proceeding"); Brown v. McCormick, 608 F.2d 410,415-16 (10th Cir. 1979)
(noting that those seeking to enjoin state court proceedings must satisfy the general equitable
requirements for the issuance of injunctions); Allan D. Vestal, Protecting a Federal Court
Judgment, 42 TENN. L. REv. 635, 661-71 (1975); Comment, Anti-Suit Injunctions Between
State and Federal Courts, 32 U. CHi. L. Rv. 471, 485-86 (1965).
240. See C. Douglas Floyd, Control of Break-Away State Antitrust Litigation: An Issue of
Federalism, 35 HAsTNGS L.J. 1, 30-39 (1983).
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C. Conclusion
In conclusion, the Supreme Court's expansion of the artful pleading
doctrine in Federated Department Stores was mistaken and the Court
should retract this portion of its decision at its earliest opportunity.241
The lower courts' attempts to justify the result in Federated Department
Stores are unsatisfactory and further demonstrate that Federated Depart-
ment Stores was erroneously decided. Indeed, much of the conflict be-
tween the Travelers and Sullivan opinions can be attributed to both
courts' attempts to give the narrowest possible application to Federated
Department Stores.242 Each court applied a test that precluded removal
on the facts before it. Removal might have been proper in Travelers had
the Second Circuit applied the Ninth Circuit's rule,243 and removal
would have been proper in Sullivan had the Ninth Circuit applied the
Second Circuit's rule.244
V. The Legitimacy of the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule
Although both the Avco and Federated Department Stores branches
of the artful pleading doctrine might be seen as modifications of the
master-of-the-complaint rule rather than as contradictions of the well-
pleaded complaint rule, at their cores both branches allow removal based
on a federal defense.245 Avco allows removal based on the defense of fed-
eral preemption.246 The res judicata effect of a prior federal judgment is
central to Federated Department Stores.247
The justifications for the well-pleaded complaint rule must therefore
be examined. Because the Constitution authorizes the federal courts to
241. See id. at 50-51; Williams, supra note 51, at 997-1007.
242. See Sullivan, 813 F.2d at 1375 (attempting to provide "a less expansive explanation"
for Federated Department Stores than Travelers); Travelers, 794 F.2d at 761 n. 10 (recognizing
that the "holding has the effect of defining a 'claim' more narrowly for artful pleading purposes
than for preclusion purposes"); see also Twitchell, supra note 46, at 830 n.95 (noting that
"courts and commentators alike have suggested that [Federated Department Stores] should be
read as restrictively as possible").
243. The state claims upon which the defendants sought removal in Travelers arose out of
the same transaction as the prior federal claims that had been dismissed on the merits. See
Travelers, 794 F.2d at 756-57. Therefore, the state claims would have been barred by res
judicata if the court hearing the subsequent claims could predict that the first court would have
exercised its pendent jurisdiction to hear the state claims. See supra note 211.
244. The state securities claims in Sullivan had substantially the same elements and arose
out of the same transaction as the federal securities claims that were filed before any summons
was served in the state action. See Sullivan, 813 F.2d at 1370. The state claims would have
been removable under the Second Circuit's theory.
245. See infra note 317.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 50-52, 94-96.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 199-204, 211-214.
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exercise federal question jurisdiction whenever a case contains any fed-
eral ingredient, 248 Congress has the power to modify the well-pleaded
complaint rule. The only issue is whether Congress should act to change
the rule or the courts should act to eliminate the rule by relying on Con-
gress's existing jurisdictional pronouncements. A number of cases,249 as
well as a body of academic literature,250 have criticized the well-pleaded
complaint rule. The American Law Institute has proposed that the fed-
eral courts should have removal jurisdiction over any suit involving a
substantial federal issue, whether that issue is introduced by the plaintiff
or the defendant. 251 The following section examines the wisdom of the
well-pleaded complaint rule and concludes that the rule is desirable.
A. The Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule from a Global Perspective
(1) Jurisdiction from the Outset of the Case
The well-pleaded complaint rule may be justified initially on the the-
ory that a federal court must have jurisdiction at the beginning of a
case.252 This rationale is relevant only in the context of original jurisdic-
tion. If the defendant were allowed to remove the case based upon his
assertion of a federal defense, the federal court would automatically have
jurisdiction upon the case's inception in federal court. However, Con-
gress, in its wisdom, has conditioned removal on the plaintiff's ability to
248. See supra text accompanying note 5.
249. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 4
(1983) (noting that the rule "involv[es] perhaps more history than logic"); Sullivan v. First
Affiliated Sec., Inc., 813 F.2d 1368, 1372 n.4 (9th Cir.) (noting that the Ninth Circuit has
"questioned the logic of denying removal jurisdiction to a defendant who raises a federal de-
fense"), cert denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987).
250. See, e.g., James H. Chadbourn & A. Leo Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal Ques-
tions, 90 U. PA. L. REv. 639, 665 (1942); William Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Require-
ment That a Case Arise "Directly" Under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 890, 894 (1967);
David P. Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute (pt. 2), 36 U. CHI. L.
REV. 268, 269-70 (1969); Donald L. Doemberg, There's No Reason For It; It's Just Our Policy:
Why the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of Federal Question Jurisdiction,
38 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 646-62 (1987); Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District
Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 164 (1953); Herman L. Trautman, Federal Right Jurisdiction
and the Declaratory Remedy, 7 VAND. L. REV. 445, 460-63 (1954).
251. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICION BETWEEN
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS § 1312(d) (1969) (permitting the exercise of removal jurisdic-
tion if the defendant asserts a federal defense or counterclaim); see also Sullivan, 813 F.2d at
1372 n.4 (suggesting that defendants have the right to a federal forum to assert federal
defenses).
252. See Robin E. Dieckmann, Note, Federal Jurisdiction over Declaratory Judgment
Suits--Federal Preemption of State Law, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 127, 137.
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obtain original jurisdiction. 253 Thus, the defendant may remove a case to
federal court only if the plaintiff could have commenced it there.
From the perspective of a plaintiff trying to file in federal court, it
may seem that the court needs jurisdiction from the inception of the case
to have the power to take any action.254 Although it may seem question-
able whether a court whose jurisdiction has not been established has the
power even to compel the defendant to file an answer, 255 a federal court
always has jurisdiction to determine whether it has jurisdiction.256 Thus,
if a federal court's power to hear a case were to turn on the contents of
the defendant's answer, the court would necessarily have the power to
compel the filing of an answer and take any necessary action prior to the
filing of an answer. The federal courts, therefore, do not need the well-
pleaded complaint rule as an aid to establishing their jurisdiction. 257
(2) Avoiding the Anticipation of Defenses
Practical considerations nevertheless make it advisable that a federal
court have jurisdiction from the beginning of every case. The plaintiff
should not be allowed to anticipate the defendant's defenses because he
may anticipate them incorrectly and because, just as the plaintiff is
master of his complaint, the defendant should be master of his answer.258
Therefore, if the well-pleaded complaint rule were eliminated in the con-
text of original jurisdiction, it would be best to wait until the defendant
actually files an answer before determining jurisdiction. 259
There are potential drawbacks in predicating federal jurisdiction on
the contents of the answer. If this rule were followed, the complaint
might be in jurisdictional limbo for a substantial period of time.260
Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that the defend-
253. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
254. See Alan D. Hornstein, Federalism, Judicial Power and the "Arising Under" Jurisdic-
tion of the Federal Courts: A Hierarchical Analysis, 56 IND. L.J. 563, 605 (1981).
255. See id. (arguing that a court lacking jurisdiction from the commencement of the case
would not have the power to enter a default judgment).
256. See, e.g., United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 309-10 (1947).
257. See Doernberg, supra note 250, at 651-53.
258. See BATOR ET AL., supra note 9, at 997 (noting that the well-pleaded complaint rule
"might be regarded as a technical rule of convenience, designed to avoid making original juris-
diction turn on speculation as to what issues will be decisive in the litigation").
259. From the perspective of removal jurisdiction, it is unnecessary for the plaintiff to
anticipate defenses. At the time of removal, the defendant's federal defenses have already been
asserted, and the existence of jurisdiction can be examined prior to doing any other business.
As noted, however, Congress has generally conditioned removal jurisdiction on the existence
of original jurisdiction. See supra text accompanying note 253.
260. See Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919, 922 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (arguing in support of the
well-pleaded complaint rule to avoid the "uncertainty and confusion" that would result from
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ant answer the complaint within twenty days, 2 6 1 answers are seldom filed
so quickly. The defendant's time to answer is often extended by stipula-
tion. Moreover, the defendant's time to file an answer is tolled if he
moves to dismiss the complaint,262 and this motion may take an extended
period of time to litigate.
The district judge has the power to alter the time period for the
filing of an answer when the defendant fies a motion to dismiss the com-
plaint. 263 Were we to abandon the well-pleaded complaint rule, district
judges might require defendants to file immediate answers in those cases
in which federal jurisdiction does not appear on the face of the com-
plaint. 264 Therefore, the well-pleaded complaint rule is not required to
ensure that the district court is able to undertake the jurisdictional in-
quiry before embarking on other business.265
(3) Federalism
Because the procedural justifications for the well-pleaded complaint
rule are not persuasive, the viability of this rule rests on federalism. The
American Law Institute's view-that every federal issue deserves a fed-
eral forum-would be a practical disaster. It portends an explosion of
cases subject to federal jurisdiction at a time when the federal courts are
in danger of being overwhelmed by the volume of federal litigation.266
predicating jurisdiction on the defendant's answer), affd 632 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981).
261. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(a).
262. Id.
263. Id
264. The Eleventh Circuit seemed to approve a contrary procedure in Lazuka v. FDIC,
931 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1991). In Lazuka, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation re-
moved a case based on potential federal defenses, as it is permitted to do based on a specific
statutory exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule. Infra note 301. Because the FDIC had
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, it had not filed an answer at the time the district court
granted a motion to remand the case on jurisdictional grounds. Lazuka, 931 F.2d at 1538.
Reviewing the remand order under a special provision of the banking laws, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit correctly held that the district court was not in a position to judge the existence ofjurisdic-
tion until an answer was filed. See id The Eleventh Circuit also suggested, however, that the
district court should decide the motion to dismiss before requiring the filing of an answer and
determining jurisdiction. See id at 1538 n.7. The Eleventh Circuit neglected to consider how
the district court could rule on the merits of the case without first considering its jurisdiction
or the potential waste of judicial resources if the district court denied the motion to dismiss
and then was forced to remand the case.
265. See Collins, supra note 15, at 757.
266. Eg., HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 124-27
(1973). Some have suggested that portions of the current federal question jurisdiction should
be relegated to the state courts in order to reduce the burden on federal courts. E.g., Jon 0.
Newman, Restructuring Federal Jurisdiction: Proposals to Preserve the Federal Judicial Sys-
tem, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 761, 768-70 (1989). But see Doernberg, supra note 250, at 653-55.
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As discussed below, the American Law Institute's view is also unsound
as a matter of theory. 267
a. The Center-of-Gravity View
The existence of a single federal defense should not determine
whether the federal courts have jurisdiction. The federal courts' jurisdic-
tion should extend to cases that are primarily concerned with federal
law.268 Cases that are primarily concerned with state law should be re-
solved in the state courts. This division of judicial business, which I call
the center-of-gravity view, makes sense in light of the relative compe-
tence and loyalties of the judges in each system.
Employing a federal decisionmaker in cases in which federal issues
predominate, and a state decisionmaker in cases in which state law pre-
dominates, is likely to increase the accuracy of judicial decisionmaking. I
do not mean to suggest that federal judges are incompetent to apply state
law or that state judges are incompetent to apply federal law. If this were
true, our judicial system could not function because both federal and
state courts are often required to apply the law of other jurisdictions. 269
The accuracy of decision making should increase, however, if cases are
tried in courts that are applying the law with which they are the most
familiar.270
Justice Scalia has suggested that Congress create specialized tribunals to handle nonessential
federal claims. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., Scalia Proposes Major Overhaul of U.S. Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 16, 1987, § 1, at 1.
267. It has never been the law that "every person asserting a federal right is entitled to one
unencumbered opportunity to litigate that right in a federal district court." Allen v. McCurry,
449 U.S. 90, 103-04 (1980). State court decisions on federal issues have the same collateral
estoppel effect as they have in the rendering jurisdiction. Id. at 96. Through the bar of res
judicata, state court judgments can preclude a plaintiff from asserting federal claims in federal
court that he had the opportunity to raise, but did not raise, in state court. See Migra v.
Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 83-85 (1984). The Supreme Court has left
open the possibility that state res judicata rules may bar claims that lie within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the federal courts. See Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Sur-
geons, 470 U.S. 373, 386 (1985).
268. See Twitchell, supra note 46, at 818 (arguing that federal jurisdiction should exist
whenever "federal law plays a sufficiently central role" in light of "all of the key issues in the
case, including defenses and replies").
269. Every state applies conflict of law rules to determine which state's law to apply to
particular cases. The federal courts are required to apply state law to matters of substance in
diversity cases. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
270. Federal judges are often uncomfortable applying state law in diversity cases. See, e.g.,
Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 276 F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir. 1960) (Friendly, J.) (noting that
"[o]ur principal task, in this diversity of citizenship case, is to determine what the New York
courts would think the California courts would think on an issue about which neither has
thought"), vacated per curiam, 365 U.S. 293 (1961). The common-sense conclusion that
judges apply their own law more accurately is reflected in the doctrines holding that selecting a
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In addition, federal judges will most likely be more sympathetic to
federal law, and state judges will be more sympathetic to state law.
Again, I do not mean to suggest that anything approaching judicial nulli-
fication occurs when a federal court is required to enforce state law with
which it disagrees or a state court is required to do the converse. By and
large, each set of courts faithfully interprets and applies the law of the
other.271 State judges, however, who are often elected and subject to
majoritarian political pressures, have not always been as solicitous of fed-
eral rights as they are today.272 Federal judges occasionally fail to follow
state law they deem unwise.273 It is important to remember that, prior to
1988, the mandatory appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court covered
judge conversant with local law is a factor to be considered on transfer motions, see Van Dusen
v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 645 (1964), and that federal appellate courts, including the Supreme
Court, are required to give deference to district judges on matters of local state law, see, eg.,
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 204-05 (1956); see also Factors Etc., Inc.
v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 283 (2d Cir. 1981) (deferring to the Sixth Circuit's view of
Tennessee law), cert denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982).
271. The Supreme Court usually has great respect for the integrity of the state courts in
dealing with issues of federal law. See, eg., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 n.35 (1976)
(rejecting the assumption "that there now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to
constitutional rights in the trial and appellate courts of the several States"); see also Newman,
supra note 266, at 769-70 (arguing that state judges have the courage to apply federal law
faithfully). Today many litigants are choosing to bring their federal civil rights claims in state
court, see Susan N. Herman, Beyond Parity. Section 1983 and the State Courts, 54 BROOK. L.
REv. 1057, 1057-58 (1989), and some have suggested that litigants frame civil rights claims
under state rather than federal law, see William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the
Protection ofindividual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489, 491 (1977); Jon 0. Newman, The "Old
Federalism"." Protection of Individual Rights by State Constitutions in an Era of Federal Court
Passivity, 15 CONN. L. REV. 21, 21-22 (1982). Congress's faith in the state courts is demon-
strated by the fact that most federal question cases lie within the concurrent jurisdiction of the
state courts. See, e-g., Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 477-78 (1981)
(noting that the presumption is that the state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over federal
claims); Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 507-08 (1962) (same). Moreover,
Congress has made some federal claims nonremovable. See supra note 16.
272. See, eg., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 98-99 (1980) (noting that "one strong mo-
tive behind [the federal civil rights statute's] enactment was grave congressional concern that
the state courts had been deficient in protecting federal rights" (citations omitted)); Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 n.35 (1976) (noting "the unsympathetic attitude to federal constitu-
tional claims of some state judges in years past"); see also Burt Neubore, The Myth of Parity,
90 HARV. L. REv. 1105, 1105 (1977) (challenging "the illusion that state courts will vindicate
federally secured constitutional rights as forcefully as would the lower federal courts").
273. To take but one example, in McKenna v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., the Third Cir-
cuit held that the Ohio state court would recognize a discovery exception to its statute of
limitations for certain tort actions despite powerful evidence that the state court did not take
such a view. 622 F.2d 657, 669-72 (3d Cir.) (Higginbotham, 3., dissenting), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 976 (1980). One gets the sense from reading this case that the Third Circuit believed the
discovery rule was the more modern and better view.
January 1993]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
both state cases in which the losing litigant relied on federal law and
federal cases in which the losing litigant relied on state law.2 74
b. The Preference for State Courts
Some cases will not have a center of gravity. In terms of the number
and relative importance of the issues involved, they will be neither
predominantly federal nor predominantly state cases. These cases should
be heard in state court because the division of judicial business between
the federal and state courts is not symmetrical. Placing federal issues in
state court poses less of a problem for our federal system than placing
state issues in federal court.275
The Constitution does not require Congress to create federal courts
inferior to the Supreme Court of the United States. 276 The assumption of
our federal system is that most cases will be heard in state court.277 Un-
like the federal courts, the state courts are courts of plenary jurisdic-
tion.278 For most of our history, the state courts have been the primary
enforcers of federal claims. Except for the short-lived Midnight Judges
Act, which was repealed one year after its passage in 1801,279 Congress
did not provide the federal trial courts with general federal question ju-
risdiction until 1875.280 Congress did not eliminate the amount-in-con-
274. See Act of June 27, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, §§ 2-3, 102 Stat. 662 (amending 28
U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1257).
275. The commentators have long debated whether state courts have the same capacity to
determine, and respect for, federal rights as federal courts. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Ending
the Parity Debate, 71 B.U. L. Ruv. 593, 593 n.2 (1991) (collecting authorities). In assessing
whether state courts have parity with federal courts in addressing federal questions, the com-
mentators distinguish between a strong and a weak sense of parity. A weak sense of parity
signifies only that state courts are constitutionally adequate forums for adjudicating federal
questions. A strong sense of parity signifies that state and federal courts are fungible in decid-
ing federal issues. See, e.g., Susan N. Herman, Why Parity Matters, 71 B.U. L. REV. 651, 652
(1991); Michael Wells, Behind the Parity Debate: The Decline of the Legal Process Tradition in
the Law of Federal Courts, 71 B.U. L. REv. 609, 610 (1991). 1 do not claim that state courts
have parity with federal courts in the strong sense. See also Herman, supra, at 652; Wells,
supra, at 615. I claim only that state courts have parity with federal courts in the weak sense
and that the cost of employing a state decisionmaker on federal questions is less than the cost
of employing a federal decisionmaker on state questions. Therefore, I propose a state deci-
sionmaker for cases that are equally weighted between state and federal law.
276. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1 (providing that "[tlhe judicial power of the United
States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish").
277. In 1988, over 96% of all civil cases filed were filed in state courts. See Newman,
supra note 266, at 769.
278. See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 15 (1976).
279. Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 11, 2 Stat. 89, 92, repealed by Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8,
§ 1, 2 Stat. 132, 132.
280. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470.
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troversy requirement from the general federal question statute until
1980.281
Moreover, it is a more serious error for the federal courts to hear a
case they ought not to have heard than to decline to hear a case they
might have heard. In the former situation, the federal courts have vio-
lated their limited jurisdiction and deprived the state courts of their
rightful jurisdiction. In the latter circumstance, apart from the relatively
unusual cases that are exclusively federal, the state courts have heard a
matter that was alternatively within their jurisdiction. A number of well-
established rules demonstrate that the federal courts are more concerned
with erroneously exercising jurisdiction282 than they are with erroneously
declining jurisdiction.283
The preference for state court in mixed cases is also evidenced by
the roles of federal and state courts in our federal system. When federal
judges apply state law, they are applying the law of other jurisdictions.
When judges decide hard cases, they are to some extent making law.284
A federal court deciding state issues attempts to make law in the same
way the state courts would if they had the chance. A federal court is
required to predict the law that the state's highest court would apply,2 85
and there is little or no opportunity for state input into the decision mak-
ing process. 286
281. See supra note 35.
282. The right to challenge federal jurisdiction is never waived and may be asserted by the
party that invoked federal jurisdiction. See, e.g., American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn., 341
U.S. 6, 17-19 (1951); Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 126, 127 (1804). The court is
required to examine the basis of its jurisdiction sua sponte. See, e.g., Louisville & N.R.R. v.
Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908). If jurisdiction is lacking, the court is required to dismiss
the case without regard to any unfairness to the parties or waste of judicial resources. See, e.g.,
Peralta Shipping Corp. v. Smith & Johnson (Shipping) Corp., 739 F.2d 798, 804 n.6 (2d Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1031 (1985).
283. This concern is reflected in the fact that the removal statute is strictly construed and
all doubts are to be resolved against removal. See, e.g., Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets,
313 U.S. 100, 106-07 (1941); Boyer v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 959 (1991). If a federal court decides that it lacks removal jurisdiction,
there is generally no appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1988); Thermtron Prods. v. Herman-
sdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 345-46 (1976) (holding that a remand order is reviewable only if based
on a ground not specified in the removal statute).
284. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 102 (1945) (discrediting the view that
law is "a 'brooding omnipresence' of Reason, of which decisions [are] merely evidence and not
themselves the controlling formulations"); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938)
(rejecting the view that there is "a transcendental body of law"). Compare H.L.A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW 121-32 (1961) (arguing that judges make law in hard cases) with RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIoUsLY 81-130 (1978) (arguing that judges apply principles in
hard cases).
285. See, e.g., West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 226-27 (1940).
286. State participation is possible only in those states that have certification procedures.
January 1993] ARTFUL PLEADING DOCTRINE
By contrast, when state judges apply federal law, they do so in much
the same way as when they apply state law. State judges do not predict
the law the United States Supreme Court would utilize. Instead, they
employ their best view of federal law in light of Supreme Court precedent
just as the lower federal courts do. 287 The state courts are not bound by
the holdings of the inferior federal courts. 288 If the state courts err in
deciding federal issues, the Supreme Court has the ability to correct these
errors in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction,28 9 just as it does for the
lower federal courts.290
There is one reason for preferring a federal forum in cases that lack
a clear center of gravity. If state law conflicts with federal law, a federal
court is more likely to respect the supremacy of federal law.29 1 However,
given the state courts' role in our federal system, the general integrity of
state courts, and the potential for Supreme Court review, this considera-
tion does not justify litigating cases containing both federal and state is-
sues in a federal forum.
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-199a (West Supp. 1992); ILL. SuP. CT. R. 20 (West
1992); N.Y. R. OF CT. § 500.17 (McKinney 1992); TEX. R. APP. P. 114 (West 1992). Even in
cases applying the law of these states, certification is justified only in exceptional circum-
stances. E.g., Bethphage Lutheran Serv. v. Weicker, 965 F.2d 1239, 1246 (2d Cir. 1992).
287. The different function state courts perform in adjudicating federal issues may be illus-
trated with an example. If the federal courts predict that a state supreme court rule is outmo-
ded, they may depart from that rule if they predict that the state supreme court would
currently change its view. See, e.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 204-
05 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Indianapolis Airport Auth. v. American Airlines, 733
F.2d 1262, 1272 (7th Cir. 1984); Ann Arbor Trust Co. v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health
Ins., 527 F.2d 526, 527 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993 (1976). It is improper,
however, for the lower federal courts to refuse to follow a prior Supreme Court precedent on
the ground that the Supreme Court would probably change its mind. See Rodriguez de Quijas
v. Shearson/American Express, Inc. 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989). Presumably the state courts
have no more freedom than the lower federal courts to ignore existing Supreme Court
precedent.
288. See lB JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.402(1), at 23
(2d ed. 1992).
289. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (1988 & Supp. 1 1989 & Supp. II 1990). Although the
Supreme Court is able to hear only a small percentage of all cases in which review is sought in
any given year, see The Supreme Court, 1990 Term-The Statistics, 105 HARV. L. REV. 419,
423 (1991) (noting that during the 1990 Term, the Supreme Court disposed of 129 cases by
written opinion and 112 cases by memorandum decision out of 5412 cases in which review was
sought), Supreme Court review of state cases is at least a possibility. Federal cases disposing of
state law issues cannot be appealed to a state appellate court.
290. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254(l) (1988 & Supp. 1 1989 & Supp. 11 1990).
291. See Doernberg, supra note 250, at 647-49.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44
ARTFUL PLEADING DOCTRINE
c. The Current Jurisdictional Rules
The federal courts should have jurisdiction if and only if a case has a
federal center of gravity. This approach accounts well for the cases the
federal courts are currently allowed to entertain on a federal question
basis. If the plaintiff asserts federal claims, any substantive defenses are
usually federal.292 Although federal law sometimes incorporates ele-
ments of state law,293 most cases in which the plaintiff asserts federal
claims have a federal center of gravity.
Of course, the plaintiff may choose to join pendent state claims with
his federal claims, and the defendant may choose to assert state defenses
to these claims. These state issues may predominate over the federal is-
sues in number and importance. When this situation occurs, however,
the federal judge is always free to exercise his discretion in declining to
exercise jurisdiction over the state claims and defenses.294
The center-of-gravity approach also supports the well-pleaded com-
plaint rule. If the plaintiff's claims are founded wholly on state law, and
the defendant asserts federal defenses, the benefits of having federal or
state adjudication are equally weighted. Any advantage in having the
federal defenses considered by a federal judge is balanced by the cost of
losing a state decisionmaker for the state claims.
If the well-pleaded complaint rule usually resulted in a tie between
the benefits of federal and state court adjudication, it would be proper to
break this tie in favor of state court jurisdiction.295 However, a tie is not
the general result. It is the most generous result from the perspective of
federal jurisdiction. Many cases involving state claims and federal de-
292. Because federal law must prevail over contrary state law, state law will not usually
provide a defense to federal claims. To fill gaps in statutory schemes, the federal courts wil
often create federal common law to deal with potential defenses to congressionally created
claims. E.g., Dice v. Akron, C. & Y.R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 361-62 (1952) (holding that the
validity of the release of a claim under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-
60 (1946 & Supp. 11 1948), is governed by federal common law).
293. See, e.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726-29 (1979) (incorpo-
rating state law to determine priority of liens under a federal lending program).
294. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). The center-of-gravity
test does not explain the federal courts' jurisdiction over state-created claims that contain a
substantial federal element. In such a case, a number of the plaintiff's claims may turn on
important issues of state law and the defendant may have state law defenses. The center of
gravity in the majority of these cases seems to be state law. Perhaps for this reason, the
Supreme Court has sharply limited plaintiffs' ability to gain access to a federal forum by incor-
porating federal elements into state claims. See supra note 10; see also Linda R. Hirshman,
Whose Law Is It, Anyway? A Reconsideration of Federal Question Jurisdiction over Cases of
Mixed State and Federal Law, 60 IND. L.J. 17, 63-72 (1984) (arguing for a return to the rule
that a case arises under the law that creates the claim).
295. See supra text accompanying notes 275-291.
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fenses will also involve state defenses. Thus, a majority of cases in which
the plaintiff's claims are based wholly on state law should be heard in
state court.2
96
Implementing a bright-line test such as the well-pleaded complaint
rule inevitably results in some cases in which federal law predominates
being heard in state court.297 Rather than adopting a bright-line rule, a
court might inquire on a case-by-case basis whether a particular case is
predominantly federal, based on relevant quantitative and qualitative fac-
tors.298 Adopting such a case-by-case approach would maximize accu-
racy in identifying predominantly federal cases. The gains in accuracy
would, however, be outweighed by substantial efficiency costs. 299
Under an ad hoe system it would be impossible to predict which
federal issues a federal judge would deem sufficiently important to war-
rant the exercise of federal jurisdiction. As a consequence, some plain-
tiffs would inaccurately gauge the judge's sense of the case and file claims
that would be dismissed. Others would view the unpredictability of the
jurisdictional rules as an incentive to litigate. 30° The well-pleaded com-
296. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 11
(1983) (noting that "[flor many cases in which federal law becomes relevant only insofar as it
sets bounds for the operation of state authority, the well-pleaded complaint rule makes sense as
a quick rule of thumb"); Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litiga-
tion, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605, 611-12 (1981) (arguing against allowing removal of state
criminal or administrative proceedings based on federal constitutional defenses); Jeffery L.
Norton, Note, Removal Doctrine Reaffirmed: Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers
Vacation Trust, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 557, 571 (1985) (arguing that "[t]he well-pleaded com-
plaint rule properly strikes the balance between state and federal jurisdiction ... by excluding
cases predominantly founded upon state law from federal courts").
297. For example, in Franchise Tax Board and Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S.
149 (1908), the Supreme Court denied removal under the well-pleaded complaint rule even
though the only disputed issues related to federal defenses. See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at
12; Mottley, 211 U.S. at 151-52.
298. See Cohen, supra note 250, at 916 (suggesting an ad hoe test for federal question
jurisdiction that would consider: the effect of recognizing jurisdiction on the federal docket,
the likelihood that a class of cases will turn on federal issues, the degree of federal expertise in
particular areas, and the need for a sympathetic federal tribunal for particular types of cases).
299. See Michael B. Thornton, Comment, Intimations of Federal Removal Jurisdiction in
Labor Cases: The Pleadings Nexus, 1981 DUKE L.J. 743, 761-64 (arguing against applying an
ad hoe test to determine removal under the artful pleading doctrine). The well-pleaded com-
plaint rule can itself be difficult to apply. For example, the rule is sometimes problematic in
declaratory judgment cases in which the court must reconstruct the underlying coercive action
and ask whether the party that would have been the plaintiff in the coercive action could have
gained access to federal court. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 13-22. However, in
most cases, the application of the well-pleaded complaint rule is straightforward. Moreover,
even in hard cases, the jurisdictional inquiry can be accomplished at the outset on the plead-
ings without having to consider any questions connected to the merits.
300. Judge Newman of the Second Circuit has suggested a method that minimizes the
efficiency costs of discretionary review of cases in which federal jurisdiction might attach.
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plaint rule avoids the large costs of case-by-case investigation by fairly
approximating the cases that belong in the federal courts.
B. The Artful Pleading Doctrine as an Exception to the Well-Pleaded
Complaint Rule
Although the well-pleaded complaint rule is generally well founded,
there are explicit exceptions to the rule.30 1 The rule has also been
manipulated to allow federal jurisdiction based upon what are essentially
federal defenses.302 This section examines whether the artful pleading
doctrine should stand as an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule
and concludes that it should not.
(1) Importance of the Federal Interests
The artful pleading doctrine is arguably a strong candidate for an
exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule.303 The rule allows removal
based upon federal defenses that are dispositive of the plaintiffs state
Under Judge Newman's proposal, a party seeking access to the federal courts would submit an
affidavit detailing the reasons his case is worthy of federal consideration. A federal appellate
judge would summarily dispose of the petition without engaging in fact-finding or issuing an
opinion. The judge's decision would be final and unreviewable. See Newman, supra note 266,
at 771-73.
301. Federal officials may remove cases based upon their federal defenses to state claims.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (1988); Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 139 (1989). Removal may be
predicated upon the existence of certain federal civil rights defenses to state claims. See 28
U.S.C. § 1443 (1988); Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 805-06 (1966). The Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation may remove cases based on federal defenses. See 12 U.S.C.
§ 1819(b)(2)(B) (1988 & Supp. I 1989 & Supp. 111990); Lazuka v. FDIC, 931 F.2d 1530, 1535
(11th Cir. 1991).
302. Just as a plaintiff may not gain access to federal court by anticipating defenses, a
potential defendant may not gain access to federal court by seeking a declaratory judgement
that any state claims against him are barred by federal law. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Con-
struction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 14-19 (1983). If the potential defendant is able
to seek an injunction on the ground that enforcement of state law would violate federal law,
however, federal question jurisdiction exists. See, eg., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85,
96 n.14 (1983); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 160-62 (1908). Moreover, if the potential de-
fendant has the capacity to seek an injunction against state regulation that is allegedly incon-
sistent with federal law, he can also get a declaratory judgment to this effect because there is a
coercive action involving a substantial federal question in which he would be a plaintiff. See
Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 298 (1988); Lawrence County v. Lead-
Deadwood Sch. Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 259 n.6 (1985).
303. See Segreti, Vesting the Whole, supra note 92, at 554-63 (arguing that federal preemp-
tion defenses should be heard in federal court); Twitchell, supra note 46, at 818-19 (arguing
that the well-pleaded complaint rule loses much of its utility in preemption disputes); Blumen-
feld, supra note 64, at 356-61 (arguing that federal rather than state courts should decide issues
of federal preemption); cf Dieckmann, supra note 252, at 158-75 (arguing that the federal
courts should have jurisdiction to resolve certain declaratory judgment actions relating to the
scope of federal preemption).
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claims.30 4 If federal preemption or res judicata applies, the plaintiff has
no state claims left to try in state court. If federal preemption or res
judicata does not apply, the state claims can be remanded to state court
for trial before a state judge.
Moreover, the artful pleading doctrine implicates important federal
policies. 30 5 Under the preemption branch of the artful pleading doctrine,
removal is allowed either because Congress has preempted a state claim
and replaced it with a parallel federal claim or because Congress has
wholly preempted a particular area of the law.30 6 In either case, Con-
gress has manifested a special concern that an entire area of the law be
exclusively federal. 307 Similarly, protecting the res judicata impact of
federal judgments was of such significance to Congress that it amended
the Anti-Injunction Act. This amendment overruled the Supreme
Court's holding that the federal courts could not enjoin state courts from
conducting proceedings barred by the res judicata impact of a prior fed-
eral judgment. 30 8
Despite the importance of the federal policies implicated by the art-
ful pleading doctrine, they do not justify an exception to the well-pleaded
complaint rule. These federal policies are no more important than those
policies furthered by other federal defenses that do not allow removal. 30 9
The federal interests protected by the artful pleading doctrine also cannot
outweigh both the cost of losing a state decisionmaker in cases that, as a
class, are likely to revolve around state law and the cost to our federal
system, which presumes that cases will be tried in state court absent a
compelling reason to exercise federal jurisdiction.
304. See Doernberg, supra note 250, at 656-59 (arguing that either party should be able to
obtain a federal forum for any case in which a federal issue is outcome-determinative); Herbert
Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 216, 233-34 (1948) (arguing that dispositive federal defenses should provide the basis
for removal jurisdiction).
305. See Segreti, Vesting the Whole, supra note 92, at 540 (arguing that "[t]here are few
federal questions of more significance to our system of federalism than whether federal law
displaces state law").
306. See supra text accompanying notes 47-49, 83-90.
307. See Blumenfeld, supra note 64, at 359 (arguing that federal preemption "indicates
that Congress is according special significance to the preemptive body of federal law").
308. See 17 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 4226, at 540-45 (2d ed. 1988). Of course, the
existence of the injunctive remedy also reduces the necessity of allowing removal to protect the
scope of a prior federal judgment. See supra text accompanying notes 238-240.
309. See Moss, supra note 51, at 1630 (arguing that "cases that fall under the complete
preemption doctrine are not clearly distinguishable from all other cases in which federal laws
are asserted in defense of state claims"). For example, the federal defenses in Louisville &
N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908), were of constitutional magnitude. See id. at 151-52.
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(2) Judicial Efficiency
Considerations of judicial efficiency also suggest that the artful
pleading doctrine should not be recognized as an exception to the well-
pleaded complaint rule. The removal process always results in some
waste of state resources. 310 Although rulings by the state court remain in
effect after removal, they may be reexamined by the federal district
court.31' Under current law, dual proceedings are kept to a minimum
because removal must be sought within thirty days from the time a case
first becomes removable. 312 Therefore, removal usually occurs, if at all,
within thirty days from the filing or service of the complaint.
Removal based on the contents of a defendant's answer would allow
for a more significant delay. Many states follow the federal rule that a
motion to dismiss tolls the time in which a defendant must file an an-
swer.313 Although the federal courts would presumably require the filing
of an immediate answer to ensure jurisdiction if the well-pleaded com-
plaint rule were eliminated,314 there would be no reason for the state
courts to impose this requirement because they are courts of plenary ju-
risdiction. Since the defendant controls the timing of his answer, and
since there is no time limit on the removal of federal question cases, 315
removal would be allowed until the state trial court decided all the dis-
positive motions addressed to the complaint. 316
Changing the law to allow removal based on federal defenses would
also waste federal judicial resources in a substantial number of cases.
The artful pleading doctrine often requires a federal court to determine
the merits of a federal defense as a condition of exercising jurisdiction.317
310. See Akhil R. Amar, A Neo-Federalist View ofArticle 111: Separating the Two Tiers of
Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REv. 205, 269-70 (1985).
311. See 28 U.S.C. § 1450 (1988).
312. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1988).
313. E.g., MD. R. Civ. P. 2-321(c) (Michie 1992); N.Y. CIV. PRAc. L. & R. 3211(0 (Mc-
Kinney 1992).
314. See supra text accompanying notes 260-264.
315. Cf 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1988) (providing that removal based on diversity of citizen-
ship must occur within one year of commencement of the action).
316. Changing the law to allow removal based on federal defenses may allow abuse by
state court defendants. Since defendants control the timing of their answer, they could gauge
the sympathies of a state judge during preliminary proceedings, or simply delay for an ex-
tended period before filing an answer and removing the case based on federal defenses. Cur-
rent law does not permit these potential abuses. Under current law, the circumstances that
allow removal subsequent to the filing of the complaint are within the control of persons other
than the defendant. If a case is not removable based on the complaint, it may become remova-
ble based on amendments to the complaint, such as the inclusion of a federal claim, or actions
by the state court, such as the dismissal of a nondiverse party.
317. The preemption branch of the artful pleading doctrine allows remand in some cases
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If a federal district court holds that the plaintiff's state claims are barred,
and that holding is not disturbed on appeal, the outcome is efficient.
Federal courts have decided a federal issue, and there are no state issues
to be tried.
However, if a federal district court holds that federal law does not
bar the plaintiff's state claims and remands the case, the outcome is ineffi-
cient. The district court's ruling on the merits of the federal defense is
not preclusive and the defense may be reasserted in state court.318 More-
over, if a district court's finding that federal law bars the plaintiff's state
without requiring a determination of the merits of a federal defense. Removal, however, al-
ways requires a finding of federal preemption. Under the replacement preemption model, the
district court is required to reach the merits of the preemption issue once it determines that a
federal claim exists that arguably preempts the plaintiff's state claims. See Twitchell, supra
note 46, at 865. Under the complete preemption model, the district court can avoid the pre-
emption question only if it decides that the plaintiff's state claims are clearly outside any areas
that Congress has wholly occupied. See supra note 104 and accompanying text; supra text
accompanying notes 113, 125. The res judicata view of the dual filing branch of the artful
pleading doctrine equates the jurisdictional and res judicata issues. See supra text accompany-
ing note 211. Only the election-of-remedies view of the dual filing branch of the doctrine
potentially allows removal without considering the merits of a federal defense. However, even
this theory may require the district court to decide issues that are analytically indistinguishable
from the res judicata inquiry. See supra text accompanying notes 199-202.
318. Cf. BATOR, supra note 9, at 618 (arguing against allowing federal courts to review
federal defenses separately when such determinations will not be binding on the state courts).
The district court's remand order is generally not reviewable in a court of appeals. See 28
U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1988); Thermtron Prods. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 345-46 (1976)
(noting that review of remand orders is proper only if the remand is based on grounds not
specified in the removal statute); Hansen v. Blue Cross, 891 F.2d 1384, 1390 (9th Cir. 1989)
(refusing to assert appellate jurisdiction over a remand decision without deciding whether such
decision is preclusive in state court). For a ruling to be preclusive, the losing party must have
had the ability to seek appellate review. Gelb v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 798 F.2d 38, 44-45 (2d
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 948 (1987). Because the court of appeals normally has no
ability to review the remand order by discretion or otherwise, federal rulings on the merits of
federal defenses resulting from the artful pleading inquiry should not be preclusive. See Whit-
man v. Raley's Inc., 886 F.2d 1177, 1179, 1182 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that a district court's
remand of state claims on the ground that they were "not preempted in any degree" by federal
law did not "have any preclusive effect on the substantive matters before the state court");
Survival Sys. v. United States Dist. Ct., 825 F.2d 1416, 1418 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that
federal preemption could still be raised as a defense in state court to state claims remanded by
the district court on the ground that they were not preempted by federal law), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 1042 (1988). But see Yamachika, supra note 51, at 351. In In re Life Insurance Co. of
North America, 857 F.2d 1190 (8th Cir. 1988), the Eighth Circuit held that a remand order
was reviewable due to the preclusive effect of the district court's rulings on a preemption de-
fense. Id. at 1193. The Eighth Circuit has the matter backwards. Because the remand order is
not reviewable, it has no preclusive effect. Moreover, when deciding federal issues, a state
court must follow only the higher state courts and the Supreme Court of the United States. A
state court is not required to follow federal district courts or federal courts of appeals. See
supra text accompanying note 288. Therefore, a district court's remand order is not binding
on the state courts as a matter of stare decisis.
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claims is ultimately reversed by a court of appeals or the United States
Supreme Court, it may take a substantial period of time before the plain-
tiff is able to return to state court with his state claims.
In addition, the artful pleading doctrine wastes federal judicial re-
sources because it is exceedingly difficult to apply.3 19 This difficulty ac-
counts in large part for the huge number of decided cases involving the
doctrine.3 20 Lack of clarity in the law tends to encourage litigation. Dis-
putes among and within circuits regarding the proper application of both
branches of the artful pleading doctrine illustrate the problems courts
face in applying the artful pleading doctrine. 321 Any benefits resulting
from having federal courts determine federal preemption and res judicata
defenses are outweighed by the large costs of determining the forum in
which the case should be tried.322
A possible solution to the judicial efficiency problem is to employ
methods similar to those now utilized by the federal courts in divorcing
jurisdictional considerations from the merits when jurisdiction rests on
the plaintiff's claims.323 Under this approach either the plaintiff or the
defendant would be favored for jurisdictional purposes. If the plaintiff
were favored, removal would not be allowed based on federal preemption
or res judicata unless the plaintiff's claims were clearly barred by one of
these defenses.324 This approach has two potential virtues: a state deci-
sionmaker would be presiding over what are likely to be predominantly
state law cases, and the defendant would have access to a federal forum
in those cases in which the federal interest is paramount. The plaintiff's
preference rule, however, has been squarely rejected by the Supreme
Court.3 25
If the defendant were favored, removal would be allowed whenever
it was fairly arguable that the plaintiff's claims were barred by federal
preemption or res judicata, and the federal court would be authorized to
adjudicate the state claims if they were not barred. The defendant's pref-
erence rule has been used in the small number of cases in which explicit
319. See, eg., Bartholet v. Reishauer A.G., 953 F.2d 1073, 1075 (7th Cir. 1992) (describ-
ing the artful pleading doctrine as "a doctrine only a judge could love").
320. See supra notes 48-49, 131-132.
321. See supra notes 133-142 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying notes 192-
221.
322. See Bartholet, 953 F.2d at 1075 (arguing that "[e]xtended proceedings to determine
where to litigate are seldom worth the cost but are inevitable under the current rules").
323. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
324. See Floyd, supra note 240, at 19 (arguing that "the artful pleading doctrine should be
invoked to support removal only when the state law claims are frivolous").
325. See supra note 103.
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exceptions to the well-pleaded complaint rule have been established. 326
This rule also parallels the disposition of state claims in the pendent juris-
diction context: When substantial federal resources have been expended,
the federal court may proceed to adjudicate the state claims even though
the federal claim on which jurisdiction was premised has been
dismissed. 327
The defendant's preference rule would require the federal courts to
allow removal of state claims based upon the mere possibility of federal
preclusion. When the possibility of federal preclusion is small, the fed-
eral interest in enforcing federal preemption and res judicata is out-
weighed by both the cost of losing a state decisionmaker in cases that are
likely to revolve around state law and the general presumption in favor of
state court jurisdiction.328
Moreover, the artful pleading context is distinguishable from other
situations in which removal is allowed based on the assertion of federal
defenses. Although Congress has explicitly allowed removal based on
the assertion of certain civil rights defenses, 329 this exception to the well-
pleaded complaint rule has been construed narrowly and does not por-
tend a large increase in federal question jurisdiction.330
The other statutes that have been construed to create exceptions to
the well-pleaded complaint rule appear to allow federal officers or entities
to remove state claims based on the parties' status. 331 Under these stat-
utes, the courts have imposed as an additional requirement that the re-
moving parties have a colorable federal defense. This requirement serves,
in part, to ensure that these statutes fall within constitutional parame-
326. See Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 139 (1989) (holding that removal by federal
officials under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (1988) must be based on the assertion of a colorable federal
defense); Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 804-05 (1966) (allowing removal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1443 (1964) based on the assertion of a defense under any law specifically defending civil
rights in terms of racial equality); Lazuka v. FDIC, 931 F.2d 1530, 1535 (11th Cir. 1991)
(applying Mesa to the FDIC removal statute).
327. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725-26 (1966); Floyd, supra note
240, at 28 n.184 (collecting cases).
328. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 190 (1985)
(arguing that "[i]t would be a serious mistake to make all cases in which a federal defense was
asserted removable as a matter of right. In many cases the federal defense would have little
merit-would, indeed, have been concocted purely to confer federal jurisdiction").
329. See 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1988).
330. See, e.g., Johnson v. Mississippi, 421 U.S. 213, 222-27 (1975); City of Greenwood v.
Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 831-34 (1966).
331. See 12 U.S.C. § 1819 (b)(2)(A) (1988 & Supp. 1 1989 & Supp. 11 1990) (providing
that "all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity to which the [FDIC] is a party shall
be deemed to arise under the laws of the United States"); 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (1988) (allowing
removal by "[a]ny officer of the United States" who is sued or prosecuted "for any act under
color of such office").
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ters.332 Thus, allowing removal based on colorable federal defenses has
generally involved a judicial attempt to narrow rather than expand the
scope of removal jurisdiction.
The artful pleading context can also be distinguished from the pen-
dent jurisdiction context. Although federal courts are permitted to adju-
dicate pendent state claims in cases in which no federal issues remain,
this situation occurs only when the plaintiff chose, or had the opportu-
nity to choose, a federal forum. Pendent jurisdiction gives the plaintiff
the option to litigate all his claims in federal court. To further judicial
efficiency, a federal court may be required to adjudicate state claims
when there are no federal claims left in the suit.333 There is no equivalent
compensation to plaintiffs in the artful pleading context. In the artful
pleading context, the plaintiff derives no benefit from the existence of a
federal forum.
(3) Congressional Intent
Finally, the artful pleading doctrine is inconsistent with the will of
Congress. The scope of federal question jurisdiction is nothing more
than an application of the projected intent of Congress. The general fed-
eral question statute is magisterially silent on which cases arise under
federal law, on whether the well-pleaded complaint rule is generally a
good doctrine, and on whether the artful pleading doctrine is a legitimate
exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule.
There is support for the theory that Congress intended to vest the
federal district courts with the whole of constitutional federal question
jurisdiction when it passed the first federal question statute in 1875. 334
Soon after its passage, however, the federal courts gave a more restricted
reading to this statute, and the law has remained the same for over one
332. Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 137-39 (1989). Mesa appears to be undercut by the
Supreme Court's decision in American National Red Cross v. S.G., 112 S. Ct. 2465, 2466-67
(1992), in which the Court held that the Red Cross could remove cases based on its status
under a federal statute that permitted it to sue and be sued in federal court. The Court's brief
treatment of the scope of constitutional federal question jurisdiction, id at 2472, did not in-
clude a discussion of Mesa.
333. It should also be noted that in the pendent jurisdiction context, dismissal of any fed-
eral claims is on the merits and those claims may not be relitigated in any state proceeding.
See supra note 58. Thus, although pendent jurisdiction may create delay in getting state claims
back to state court, and may sometimes require federal courts to adjudicate cases between
nondiverse parties that involve only state law, allowing pendent jurisdiction never involves
relitigation of the federal claim upon which jurisdiction was initially based.
334. See Collins, supra note 15, at 722-23.
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hundred years. 335 Perhaps congressional silence may be interpreted as a
tacit affirmation of the validity of the well-pleaded complaint rule, espe-
cially in light of the rule's longtime acceptance.3 36 The courts have often
viewed the rule as beyond question due to its ancient lineage. 337 The
well-pleaded complaint rule's ancient lineage also helps to explain the
courts' hesitancy in admitting that the artful pleading doctrine is incon-
sistent with the rule.338
Inferring Congressional intent based on Congressional silence is a
hazardous enterprise. Congress may have wanted the courts to use
sound policy in determining the exact scope of federal jurisdiction, or
Congress may simply have focused its attention on items less esoteric
than federal jurisdiction. Congressional silence cuts both ways in the art-
ful pleading context. Just as Congress may have accepted the well-
pleaded complaint rule as a result of its inaction, Congress may now have
accepted the artful pleading doctrine, which is approaching its twenty-
fifth anniversary. 339 This interpretation is questionable in that Congress
has adopted explicit statutory exceptions to the well-pleaded complaint
rule.340 A fair interpretation is that Congress intends other cases involv-
ing federal defenses to be nonremovable. Consequently, the artful plead-
ing doctrine should not continue to be seen as an exception to the well-
pleaded complaint rule.
VI. Conclusion
In 1968, the Supreme Court in Avco adopted the artful pleading doc-
trine. The Court gave little consideration to the merits of the doctrine or
the manner in which the doctrine affected established law. In circular
fashion, it noted only that the plaintiff's claim was "controlled by federal
substantive law."' 341 Most courts and commentators have accepted with-
out question the pristine form of the artful pleading doctrine exemplified
335. See Metcalf v. Watertown, 128 U.S. 586, 589-90 (1888) (denying the plaintiff access
to federal court on the basis of potential federal defenses).
336. When Congress amends a statute and does nothing to change well-accepted judicial
precedent, it is deemed to accept that precedent. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459
U.S. 375, 385-86 (1983); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353,
381-82 (1982). The federal question statute has been amended numerous times since the Met-
calf decision in 1888. E.g., Pub. L. No. 96-486, § 2(a), 94 Stat. 2369 (1980) (eliminating the
amount in controversy requirement).
337. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 9-12.
338. See supra note 216.
339. See Twitchell, supra note 46, at 869 (arguing that "[i]t is too late to restrict all
recharacterization removal").
340. See supra note 301.
341. Avco, 390 U.S. at 560.
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by Avco. A close examination of Avco reveals that the artful pleading
doctrine is inconsistent with traditional jurisdictional principles and that
those principles, rather than the doctrine established in Avco, state the
better policy. The expansion of the artful pleading doctrine suggested by
Federated Department Stores, Franchise Tax Board, and their progeny is
not required by Avco. These cases mark an extreme departure from well-
considered law.
As a consequence, the Supreme Court should reconsider its ill-ad-
vised departure from traditional jurisdictional principles in Avco. At the
very least, the Court should restrict the artful pleading doctrine to those
cases in which federal law both preempts state law and provides replace-
ment federal claims. The Court should also reject the complete preemp-
tion model and overrule the jurisdictional holding of Federated
Department Stores. Failing action by the Court, Congress would do well
to eliminate a doctrine that is contrary to sound jurisdictional theory,
exceedingly difficult to apply, and the bane of judges and litigants alike.

